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Keeping the Zombies at Bay:  Fourth 




You may not have heard of a botnet. If you have, you may have 
linked it to election shenanigans and nothing else. But if you are 
reading this on a computer or smartphone, there is a good chance you 
are in contact with a botnet right now. 
Botnets, sometimes called “Zombie Armies,” are networks of 
devices linked by a computer virus and controlled by cybercriminals. 
Botnets operate on everyday devices owned by millions of Americans, 
and thus pose a substantial threat to individual device owners as 
well as the nation’s institutions and economy. 
Accordingly, the United States government has been fighting 
back vigorously against botnets. As botnets advance in 
sophistication, the government’s methods for taking them down have 
become more intrusive. In executing a botnet takedown, the 
government collects IP addresses of the computers interfacing with 
the botnet. Because botnets are camouflaged in personal computers 
and devices, the government is unable to know which devices are 
infected until the takedown is effectuated. 
But what about the Fourth Amendment rights of innocent 
owners, whose devices are enabling the botnet without their consent 
or knowledge? Takedowns are beneficial to the owners because they 
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liberate devices, but should we acquiesce to a government 
cyber-invasion simply because of this benefit? This Note argues no. 
Although the Fourth Amendment is implicated in botnet 
takedowns, this should not mean the government cannot perform the 
search; it simply means that the government needs to get a warrant 
authorizing the search first. This Note argues that the 2016 
amendment to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
which allows multi-district warrants to be issued by one judge, is a 
positive development for the Fourth Amendment and for the fight 
against cybercriminals. But Rule 41 must be implemented in a way 
that protects Fourth Amendment rights. To address this concern, this 
Note argues that judges should be trained regarding cybercrime, 
botnets, and the government’s takedown efforts so that judges can do 
their jobs:  Make sure the warrants are reasonable and protect the 
Fourth Amendment rights of innocent victims. 
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I. Introduction 
During the 2016 presidential campaign, Russian hackers 
commanded legions of social media bots that posed as individual 
American social media users.1 These bots were used to spread fake 
news, promulgate conspiracy theories, post unflattering 
photographs of the opposing candidates, or “simply muddy 
discussions.”2 For example, one Russian bot, disguised as “Melvin 
Redick of Harrisburg, [Pennsylvania], a friendly-looking American 
with a backward baseball cap and a young daughter,” encouraged 
Facebook users to visit a website in order to learn the “hidden truth 
about Hillary Clinton, George Soros, and other leaders of the US.”3 
The website, DCLeaks.com, was in fact a Russian-created site 
peddling stolen emails and conspiracy theories.4 Facebook reported 
that it closed hundreds of accounts believed to have been created 
by a Russian company.5 According to Twitter officials, during the 
 
 1. See Gabe O’Connor, How Russian Twitter Bots Pumped Out Fake News 
During the 2016 Election, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 3, 2017, 4:53 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2017/04/03/522503844/how-
russian-twitter-bots-pumped-out-fake-news-during-the-2016-election (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2020) (explaining that Russian Twitter bots were disguised as 
“Midwestern swing-voter Republicans” in order to enhance the credibility of the 
information proffered by the bots) [perma.cc/JHB8-CXDC]. 
 2. See John Markoff, Automated Pro-Trump Bots Overwhelmed Pro-Clinton 
Messages, Researchers Say, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/18/technology/automated-pro-trump-bots-
overwhelmed-pro-clinton-messages-researchers-say.html (last visited Sept. 27, 
2020) (explaining the purposes of the “automated army of pro-Donald J. Trump 
chatbots”) [perma.cc/7TPQ-55LV]. 
 3. Scott Shane, The Fake Americans Russia Created to Influence the 
Election, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/us/politics/russia-facebook-twitter-
election.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) [perma.cc/W577-LWWC]. 
 4. See Hamza Shaban, Twitter Suspends Guccifer and DCLeaks After 
Mueller Links them to Russian Hacking Operation, WASH. POST (July 16, 2018, 
3:35 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/07/16/twitter-
suspends-guccifer-dcleaks-after-mueller-links-them-russian-hacking-operation/ 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (noting that DCLeaks was a “digital front” created by 
Russian intelligence officers “to launder hacked information”) [perma.cc/YH4R-
PGAZ]. 
 5. See Shane, supra note 3 (“Facebook officials disclosed that they . . . shut 
down several hundred accounts that they believe were created by a Russian 
company . . . .”). 
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election, Russia created more than 50,000 fake Twitter accounts to 
push its political agenda.6 
The 2016 election thrust botnets into the spotlight, causing 
newfound concern among politicians and private individuals.7 But 
long before the 2016 election, botnets had been engaging in online 
mischief.8 
A bot is an internet-connected device that has been 
compromised by a computer hacker’s virus.9 A botnet is an army of 
bots all infected with the same virus.10 Botnets have been 
nicknamed “zombie armies” because, through the virus, the hacker 
can command the bots to act at her behest, without their owners’ 
knowledge.11 The term zombie army is also appropriate for another 
reason:  These things are extremely hard to kill.12 
The United States government had its first major victory in 
the fight against botnets in 2011.13 Its target, Coreflood, was a 
 
 6. See Jon Swaine, Twitter Admits Far More Russian Bots Posted on 
Election than It Had Disclosed, GUARDIAN (Jan. 19, 2018, 7:46 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jan/19/twitter-admits-far-more-
russian-bots-posted-on-election-than-it-had-disclosed (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) 
(“Twitter has admitted that more than 50,000 Russia-linked accounts used its 
service to post automated material about the 2016 US election . . . .”) 
[perma.cc/SQ2D-X897]. 
 7. See What Is a Botnet?, PANDA SEC. (Dec. 5, 2017), 
https://www.pandasecurity.com/mediacenter/security/what-is-a-botnet/ (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2020)  (“Facebook’s fake ad controversy and the Twitter bot fiasco 
during the 2016 presidential election worry many politicians and citizens about 
the disruptive potential of botnets.”) [perma.cc/M99A-2QYL]. 
 8. See 9 of History’s Notable Botnets, WHITE OPS (May 2018), 
https://www.whiteops.com/blog/9-of-the-most-notable-botnets (last visited Oct. 
16, 2020) (describing several notable botnet attacks, and naming the first notable 
attack as EarthLink Spammer, a botnet that was created in 2000) 
[perma.cc/FJ5B-P83L]. 
 9. See What Are Bots, Botnets, and Zombies?, WEBROOT, 
https://www.webroot.com/us/en/resources/tips-articles/what-are-bots-botnets-
and-zombies (last visited Oct. 9, 2020) (defining the term “bot”) [perma.cc/6RYL-
7EST]. 
 10. See id. (explaining what a botnet is). 
 11. See id. (explaining how botnets work). 
 12. See Lysa Myers, Top 5 Scariest Zombie Botnets, WELIVESECURITY (Oct. 
23, 2014, 3:45 PM), https://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/10/23/top-5-scariest-
zombie-botnets/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (“A network of zombies is a bit like 
post-apocalyptic infection scenarios in the movies. Some of these things are 
virtually un-killable—there always seems to be that last undead creature lurking 
in the shadows, ready to start the next wave of trouble.”) [perma.cc/H6NE-7CXE]. 
 13. See David Sancho, A Win for the Good Guys: The Coreflood Takedown, 
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criminal botnet that had been lurking on the internet since the 
early aughts.14 By 2011, it had infiltrated about 800,000 devices in 
the United States.15 Globally, the number of infected machines was 
close to 2.3 million.16 Coreflood operated by logging keystrokes in 
order to steal users’ passwords and financial information.17 The 
botnet was so successful in its criminal pursuits that Coreflood’s 
operators had access to more accounts than they could possibly 
exploit, forcing them to comb through the collected data to find 
accounts worth stealing from.18 In total, Coreflood caused at least 
twenty million dollars of damages.19 
In April 2011, the U.S. District Court in Connecticut issued an 
order allowing the government to commandeer twenty-nine 
domain names that had been used to facilitate Coreflood’s criminal 
 
SEC. INTEL. BLOG (Apr. 14, 2011, 5:46 AM), https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-
security-intelligence/a-win-for-the-good-guys-the-coreflood-takedown/ (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2020) (describing the Coreflood takedown as “a great victory for 
law enforcement and for all the good guys fighting against cybercrime”) 
[perma.cc/ECS2-BTJ6]. 
 14. See Matt Liebowitz, Feds Shut Down Massive ‘Coreflood’ Botnet, NBC 
NEWS, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/42596694/ns/technology_and_science-
security/t/feds-shut-down-massive-coreflood-botnet/#.Xhd-X5NKjfY (last updated 
Apr. 14, 2011, 4:45 PM) (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (stating that, in 2011, the 
Coreflood botnet was “believed to have been active for nearly a decade”) 
[perma.cc/J79P-NHGW]. 
 15. See Dan Goodin, Feds Declare Victory over Notorious Coreflood Botnet, 
REGISTER (June 23, 2011, 9:09 PM), 
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/06/23/coreflood_botnet_eradicated/ (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2020) (describing the 2011 Coreflood takedown and stating that 
Coreflood “enslaved almost 800,000 machines when the FBI commenced the 
operation in April”) [perma.cc/KB69-TUYZ]. 
 16. See Dan Kaplan, Coreflood Takedown May Lead to Trouble, ITNEWS (Apr. 
18, 2011, 10:34 AM), https://www.itnews.com.au/news/coreflood-takedown-may-
lead-to-trouble-254827 (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (providing an estimate of the 
total size of the Coreflood botnet) [perma.cc/CD79-VK5U]. 
 17. See id. (describing the Coreflood botnet); Janine S. Hiller, Civil 
Cyberconflict:  Microsoft, Cybercrime, and Botnets, 31 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH 
L.J. 163, 172–73 (2014) (describing the damage caused by the Coreflood botnet). 
 18. See Sam Zeitlin, Note, Botnet Takedowns and the Fourth Amendment, 90 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 746, 747 (2015) (“The Russian cybercriminals who created 
Coreflood trawled through their ever-growing trove of financial data looking for 
bank balances big enough to be worth taking—they had access to far more 
accounts than they could ever exploit.”). 
 19. See Hiller, supra note 17, at 173 (“Estimates of Coreflood damages 
exceeded $20 million.”). 
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activity.20 The order further allowed the government to substitute 
the seized servers with government-controlled servers.21 When an 
infected computer contacted the substitute servers, the servers 
responded with commands instructing the infected computers to 
temporarily stop running Coreflood software.22 The order also 
allowed the government to use a trap-and-trace device to learn the 
Internet Protocol (IP) addresses of infected machines.23 
While Coreflood’s malicious software was temporarily 
disabled, the government released the victims’ IP addresses to 
their internet service providers (ISPs) so that the providers could 
alert the victims that their machines were infected and advise 
them how to remove the malware.24 Within two months of the court 
order, “computers reporting to the botnet’s command and control 
center fell by more than 95 percent.”25 
The takedown was a huge success for the government, but for 
private individuals it was a double-edged sword.26 On one hand, 
the government had liberated thousands of victims’ devices.27 On 
 
 20. See United States v. John Doe 1, No. 3:11-CV-00561-VLB, at *5 (D. Conn. 
2011) (granting a preliminary injunction). 
 21. See id. (granting a preliminary injunction). 
 22. See id. (granting a preliminary injunction). 
 23. See Kim Zetter, With Court Order, FBI Hijacks “Coreflood” Botnet, Sends 
Kill Signal, WIRED, https://www.wired.com/2011/04/coreflood/ (last updated Apr. 
13, 2011, 7:30 PM) (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (describing the Coreflood takedown) 
[perma.cc/YG3F-SLR8]. 
 24. See id. (describing the Coreflood takedown). 
 25. Goodin, supra note 15. 
 26. See Jeff Mordock, “Inherently Invasive”:  FBI Counter-Hacking 
Operations Raise Red Flags over Privacy, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2019), 
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/jan/31/fbi-counter-hacking-
operations-raise-privacy-red-f/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (noting that law 
enforcement’s success in defeating botnets by hacking back “is a double-edged 
sword, giving authorities a new tool to fight crime in an increasingly digital world, 
but also exposing sensitive and unrelated files to law enforcement”) 
[perma.cc/65VP-3DW2]. 
 27. See Goodin, supra note 15 (explaining that the government takedown rid 
thousands of machines of Coreflood malware). 
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the other hand, the government had invaded those very same 
victims’ devices.28 And it had done so without a warrant.29  
According to the judge who issued the court order, no warrant 
was necessary.30 That determination was crucial because, at the 
time of the Coreflood takedown, under the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, no magistrate would have had the authority 
to grant a warrant for extra-district botnet takedowns.31 
Since the Coreflood takedown, cybercriminals have upped the 
ante, creating more resilient botnets.32 In turn, the government 
has developed more aggressive—and inherently more intrusive—
takedown methods.33 As botnets continue to evolve, so must the 
government’s efforts to combat them.34 It is a high stakes games of 
cops and robbers with a twist—both the cops and the robbers are 
invisible. 
Speaking of an “invisible policeman,” when does the 
government cross the line and enter Fourth Amendment 
territory?35 Between 2011 and 2016, the government performed 
 
 28. See Letter from Peter J. Kadzik, Ass’t Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to 
Ron Wyden, Senator, U.S. Senate (Nov. 18, 
2016), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3225184/DOJ-Rule-41-
Response.pdf (admitting that “some courts might hold” that the techniques used 
to collect victims’ IP addresses and disrupt a botnet implicate the Fourth 
Amendment) [perma.cc/QDE6-NY9J]. 
 29. See United States v. John Doe 1, No. 3:11-CV-00561-VLB, at *5 (D. Conn. 
2011) (granting the government’s request for civil relief). 
 30. See id. (granting the government’s request for civil relief). 
 31. See Letter from Mythili Raman, Acting Ass’t Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Just., to the Hon. Reena Raggi, Chair, Advisory Comm. on the Crim. Rules (Sept. 
18, 2013), https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Raman-
letter-to-committee-.pdf (explaining Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure needs to be amended to permit warrants for botnet takedowns) 
[perma.cc/C54B-6UCN]. 
 32. See Julian B. Gizzard et al., Peer-to-Peer Botnets:  Overview and Case 
Study, USENIX, Jan. 2007, at 1, 
https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/hotbots07/tech/full_papers/grizzard/grizzar
d.pdf (explaining that, in response to successful takedowns, attackers began 
creating sturdier botnet structures) [perma.cc/CHJ5-ER7P]. 
 33. See id. (describing the additional steps necessary to take down a stronger 
botnet). 
 34. See id. (explaining that, as botnets grow stronger, takedown methods will 
need to improve). 
 35. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 65 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring) 
(noting that a statute authorizing electronic surveillance “in effect, places an 
invisible policeman in the home”). 
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several major botnet takedowns.36 Some of these operations were 
even more invasive than the Coreflood takedown, actually 
manipulating data on victims’ devices.37 Still, in each case, the 
government was able to convince a judge that there were no Fourth 
Amendment issues.38 
In 2016, Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
was amended to allow magistrate judges to grant extra-district 
warrants in cases involving botnets.39 Privacy enthusiasts 
lampooned the change,40 but this Note argues that the amendment 
is a step in the right direction. 
 Before Rule 41 was passed, the government conducted botnet 
takedowns under civil rather than criminal law—obtaining court 
orders instead of warrants.41 This Note argues that even those 
early takedowns indeed implicated the Fourth Amendment. But 
the author is sympathetic to the government’s dilemma—it had to 
operate outside of the Fourth Amendment because the Federal 
Rules had not caught up with the times. 
This Note argues that, without the amendment to Rule 41, the 
government would be forced to continue to convince courts that 
 
 36. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Temp. Restraining 
Ord. and Ord. to Show Cause, at 3 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 28, 2016) (listing several 
successful botnet takedowns since Coreflood). 
 37. See Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchieri, How the FBI Took Down the Botnet 
Designed to Be “Impossible” to Takedown, VICE (Aug. 12, 2015, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/539xy5/how-the-fbi-took-down-the-botnet-
designed-to-be-impossible-to-take-down (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (explaining 
that, to take down the GameOver Zeus botnet, the government needed to 
persuade bots to talk only to government servers and refrain from talking to 
servers run by the cybercriminals) [perma.cc/Y646-9JTU]; see also Julian B. 
Gizzard, et al., supra note 32 (describing methods used to take down peer-to-peer 
botnets). 
 38. See United States v. Ghinkul, No. 2:2015-CV-1315, 2020 WL 85256, at 
*1, *2 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2020) (granting civil relief);  United States v. Bogachev, 
No. 2:14-CV-00685, at *4–8 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (same). 
 39. See Leslie R. Caldwell, Rule 41 Changes Ensure a Judge May Consider 
Warrants for Certain Remote Searches, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. ARCHIVES (June 20, 
2016), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/rule-41-changes-ensure-judge-
may-consider-warrants-certain-remote-searches (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) 
(explaining the purpose of the 2016 amendment to Rule 41) [perma.cc/986V-
4YR2]. 
 40. See, e.g., Mordock, supra note 26 (discussing criticism of the Rule 41 
amendments). 
 41. See Ghinkul, 2020 WL 85256, at *2 (granting civil relief); Bogachev, No. 
2:14-CV-00685, at *4–8 (same). 
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takedown methods do not implicate the Fourth Amendment. These 
decisions could lead to dangerous precedents. One possibility is 
that botnet takedowns will become an established form of exigent 
circumstances.42 An exception to the warrant requirement, exigent 
circumstances have historically been applied to situations so 
urgent that there is no time to get a warrant.43 Although this Note 
does not explore the application of exigent circumstances to botnet 
takedowns, the author suggests that such an expansion of the 
doctrine is untenable.44 
Instead, this Note will focus on dangerous precedents within 
the confines of the warrant requirement. To demonstrate the 
possibility for the perversion of search law as it relates to 
technology, this Note will focus on the government’s retrieval of IP 
addresses. This Note will argue that such retrieval is a search, 
despite some court decisions that hold otherwise.45 
The purpose of this Note is not to campaign against the 
collection of IP addresses. In fact, in the author’s view, this 
collection is one of the least intrusive steps that the government 
takes when fighting botnets. Instead, the purpose is to show that, 
because even the most innocuous step of a botnet takedown is a 
search, botnet takedowns inherently implicate the Fourth 
Amendment. 
One day, the government will have to develop means to 
overcome even more fanciful botnet disguises:  Malware that can 
embed in the smoke detector, the garage door opener, or the dog’s 
implanted identity chip.46 Of course, these attacks require a 
response. But that response must comply with civil liberties, 
including the Fourth Amendment. Rule 41 allows courts to apply 
the Fourth Amendment in the battle against botnets. When the 
 
 42. See Zeitlin, supra note 18, at 758–59 n.72 (noting the possibility that 
exigent circumstances could cover botnet takedowns). 
 43. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 473–77 (2011) (Ginsberg, J., 
dissenting) (discussing the notion that exigent circumstances require urgency). 
 44. See Zeitlin, supra note 18, at 758–59 n.72 (outlining the dangers of 
applying the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement in the 
context of botnet takedowns).  
 45. See, e.g., United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 574 (3d Cir. 
2010) (holding that the government’s retrieval of an IP address is not a search). 
 46. See MARC GOODMAN, FUTURE CRIMES 287 (Anchor Books 2015) 
(explaining that, in the future, virtually everything will be connected to the 
internet and capable of sharing data). 
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government mass hacks—even for a good cause—it should be 
regulated by the Fourth Amendment.47 
II. A Brief Explanation of Botnets 
A botnet is a network of devices linked by a virus and 
controlled remotely by a computer hacker, known as a botmaster.48 
To create a botnet, a botmaster “writes a computer program that 
searches the internet for connected devices.”49 The program 
attempts to infiltrate the devices that it finds, and, if it is 
successful, it will install the botnet virus onto the devices.50 
Botnets can attack any device connected to the internet.51 
Many commonly used smart devices are vulnerable because they 
 
 47. See Jonathan Meyer, Government Hacking, 127 YALE L.J. 570, 614 (2018) 
(“Courts should end their myopic focus on which data government malware 
retrieves and acknowledge that government hacking necessarily constitutes a 
Fourth Amendment search.”). 
 48. See Nicole Hong, Brooklyn Trial to Reveal the Inner Workings of ‘Botnet’ 
Hackers, WALL ST. J. (July 22, 2017, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/brooklyn-trial-to-reveal-inner-workings-of-botnet-
hackers-1500721201 (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (describing botnets as “a network 
of computers with malicious software”) [perma.cc/H2ES-VZ5F]; see also Hiller, 
supra note 17, at 167 (“An essential aspect of a botnet is that another party, at a 
distance, controls the network of infected computers.”). 
 49. Stephen Ornes, Rise of the Botnets, SCI. NEWS FOR STUDENTS (Feb. 21, 
2019, 6:45 AM), https://www.sciencenewsforstudents.org/article/botnets-
malware-cyberattack-increase (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) [perma.cc/886U-6Y6C]. 
 50. See id. (explaining that, once the computer program has broken into a 
device, “the program can install malware”). 
 51. See Botnet Facts, WASH. STATE OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN., 
https://www.atg.wa.gov/botnet-facts (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (“All computers 
connected to the Internet are susceptible to malware infections.”) 
[perma.cc/K5HD-982S]; see also How the FBI Investigated and Dismantled the 
Mirai Botnet, BIZTECH (June 19, 2019), 
https://biztechmagazine.com/media/video/how-fbi-investigated-and-dismantled-
mirai-botnet (explaining that “the Marai botnet attack turned Internet of Things 
devices . . . into [a] bot[] that could be used as part of a botnet in large-scale 
network attacks”) [perma.cc/RXJ9-3PL9]; see, e.g., Shaquille De Bique, The 
Botnet Threat Against Smart Refrigerator Security, 1, 3 (May, 2019) (Ph.D. 
dissertation, Utica College) (ProQuest) (explaining that smart refrigerators “are 
very susceptible to botnet attacks”); The Odd, 8-Year Legacy of the Conficker 
Worm, WELIVESECURITY (Nov. 21, 2016, 1:30 PM), 
https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/11/21/odd-8-year-legacy-conficker-worm/ 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (describing the Conficker botnet which infiltrated “MRI 
machines, CT scanners and dialysis pumps” and police body cameras) 
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come with a default password that the user never bothers to 
change.52 Cybercriminals can easily guess these passwords in 
order to hack into the device.53 For example, in 2016, “a massive 
botnet composed of baby monitors, webcams, and other common 
devices” wreaked havoc on the internet.54 
Computers with secure systems can also fall victim to a 
botnet.55 Using email attachments and pop up ads containing 
malicious website links,56 botnets “trick . . . users into 
compromising their own security.”57 Even when a device owner 
takes all of the possible precautions, botmasters can still find a way 
in.58 Botnets often infiltrate devices through known security 
vulnerabilities in commercially available security systems.59 For 
 
[perma.cc/87Z6-ZHGX]. 
 52. See Ornes, supra note 49 (“New devices like smart TVs, wi-fi routers and 
security cameras are sold with a default password in place. (It’s often something 
easy, like ‘password.’) According to a survey conducted by a computer magazine 
in June and July 2018, more than one-third of people never change their 
passwords.”). 
 53. See id. (explaining that, because of default passwords, it is “easier than 
you might think” for a cybercriminal to guess a device’s password); see also Shane 
Harris, Presidential Commission Sounds Warning over Botnet Threat, WALL ST. 
J. (Dec. 3, 2016, 6:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/presidential-commission-
sounds-warning-over-botnet-threat-1480764656 (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) 
(noting that the Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity recommended 
that a device should not be able to connect to the internet until its default 
password had been reset because default passwords “are often easy for hackers to 
guess”) [perma.cc/TD8L-38L6]. 
 54. See Harris, supra note 53 (describing an attack that resulted in 
“widespread outages and congestion”). 
 55. See Zeitlin, supra note 18, at 749 (explaining that botnets “grow by 
finding vulnerable computers and infecting them with malware,” but even 
“computers protected by firewalls and more up-to-date software” are susceptible 
to infection through “social engineering”) (citations omitted). 
 56. See Botnet Facts, supra note 51 (“If you open an email attachment or visit 
a website that is distributing malware, your computer may become 
infected . . . .”); see also What is a Botnet, supra note 7 (“The strategy typically 
requires users to infect their own systems by opening email attachments, clicking 
on malicious pop up ads, or downloading dangerous software from a website.”). 
 57. Zeitlin, supra note 18, at 749. 
 58. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Department of Justice Takes Action 
to Disable International Botnet (Apr. 13, 2011), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-takes-action-disable-
international-botnet (last visited Oct. 16, 2020) (explaining how Coreflood 
thrived) [perma.cc/7CW5-MJ9A]. 
 59. See Hiller, supra note 17, at 170 (“Ironically, releases of vulnerability 
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example, Coreflood targeted Microsoft computers in order to take 
advantage of a flaw in the Windows operating systems.60 
Botnets are particularly nefarious criminal devices because 
they are difficult to eradicate.61 The infection is discrete, so owners 
of the infected computers are generally not even aware of the 
virus’s presence.62 Even if a user is aware of the botnet’s presence, 
only a highly skilled computer user would be to able remove the 
botnet without technical assistance.63 Finally, it is difficult for law 
enforcement to identify the botnet operator.64 And, even when the 
operator is identified, she may be from another country and out of 
law enforcement’s reach.65 
 
information and patches are known to sometimes create the opposite result; 
malware can be propagated seeking to exploit the weakness before computers are 
updated.”). 
 60. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 58 (explaining that 
Coreflood “install[ed] itself by exploiting a vulnerability in computers running 
Windows operating systems”). 
 61. See Bill Brenner, Botnets: 4 Reasons It’s Getting Harder to Find and 
Fight Them, CSO (Apr. 15, 2009, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.csoonline.com/article/2123967/botnets--4-reasons-it-s-getting-
harder-to-find-and-fight-them.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2020) (explaining why it 
is very difficult to defeat botnets) [perma.cc/95ZV-2K3P]. 
 62. See Botnet Facts, supra note 51 (explaining that “[i]n the past, sluggish 
performance and annoying advertisements” alerted users that their computers 
were compromised, but “[t]hese days, there may be no outward signs you have 
malware”); see also Nicole Perlroth, Hackers Used New Weapons to Disrupt Major 
Websites Across U.S., N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 21, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/22/business/internet-problems-attack.html 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (describing a botnet that infected “internet-connected 
devices . . . without their owners’ knowledge”) [perma.cc/P2LT-QZUY]; see also 
Mark Bowden, The Worm that Nearly Ate the Internet, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/29/opinion/sunday/conficker-worm-
ukraine.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (defining botnets as “networks of secretly 
linked personal computers controlled by an unseen hand”) [perma.cc/T3E9-
LATF]. 
 63. See Zeitlin, supra note 18, at 750 (“Most botnets are difficult for all but 
the most sophisticated users to remove from their computers.”) (citations 
omitted). 
 64. See Daniel Ramsbrock et al., A First Step Toward Live Botmaster 
Traceback, Presentation at International Symposium on Research in Attacks, 
Intrusions, and Defenses (Sept. 16, 2008), at 2 (explaining the various reasons 
why “[t]racking and locating the botmaster of a discovered botnet is very 
challenging”). 
 65. See What Is a DDOS Botnet?, CLOUDFLARE, 
https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/what-is-a-ddos-botnet/ (last visited 
Oct. 24, 2019) (explaining that botnet operation is a particularly successful 
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Botnet operators use botnets for a variety of cybercrimes, both 
against the infected devices’ users and third parties.66 Botnets are 
not always committed to just one criminal objective, and 
sometimes a botnet’s primary goal will evolve over time.67 Often, 
botnets are used for financial gain.68 Cybercriminals can use 
botnets to steal data, which they can then use to steal the computer 
user’s identity or financial information.69 Alternatively, 
cybercriminals can install devices with ransomware, “which 
encrypts and hijacks files on a computer system and later demands 
money for decrypting them.”70 
Botnets have also frequently been used to launch denial of 
service attacks.71 These attacks temporarily disable websites by 
flooding them with more traffic than they can handle.72 
Sometimes, the botnet controller will demand money from the 
 
endeavor in “geographic locations where regulation and law enforcement are 
limited”) [perma.cc/ZS2K-NTTF]. 
 66. See Hong, supra note 48 (“[B]otnets . . . allow hackers to remotely control 
the computers and command them for criminal purposes, including to steal 
banking credentials, launch denial-of-service attacks and transmit viruses.”); see 
also Zeitlin, supra note 18, at 750 (“Botnets are the Swiss army knife of 
cybercrime, a ubiquitous tool used for many different purposes against both the 
users of infected computers and third parties.”).  
 67. See Zeitlin, supra note 18, at 750–51 (discussing the Coreflood botnet and 
explaining that when it “was first created sometime around 2002, its primary 
purpose was to be a tool for distributed denial of service . . . attacks,” but “[b]y 
2008, Coreflood’s focus had moved to bank fraud, using credentials stolen from 
infected computers to empty their owners’ bank accounts”) (citations omitted). 
 68. See What is a Botnet?, supra note 7 (outlining the different goals of the 
cybercriminals who command botnets and providing that one of those goals is 
financial gain). 
 69. See Botnet Facts, supra note 51 (explaining that botnets can be used to 
steal personal information for identify theft and credit card fraud). 
 70. Hong, supra note 48; see, e.g., Patricia Mazzei, Another Hacked Florida 
City Pays a Ransom, This Time for $460,000, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/27/us/lake-city-florida-ransom-
cyberattack.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2020) (reporting on a city government’s 
payout to cybercriminals who “launched a cyberattack that disabled the city’s 
computer systems”) [perma.cc/U6PW-X2B6]. 
 71. See What is A Botnet?, supra note 7 (providing that botnet operators use 
botnets in denial of service attacks and explaining how these attacks are carried 
out). 
 72. See Perlroth, supra note 62 (describing a botnet attack that disabled 
“several websites, including Twitter, Netflix, Spotify, Airbnb, Reddit, Etsy, 
SoundCloud and The New York Times” by “command[ing] [infected computers] to 
flood a target with overwhelming traffic”). 
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targeted organization in exchange for ceasing the attack.73 Even if 
no ransom is demanded, a denial of service attack can take a 
financial toll on a company whose website is attacked because, 
while the website is under attack, customers cannot use the 
company’s services.74 Denial of service attacks often target 
companies,75 but they can also target national infrastructures.76 A 
denial of service attack “on critical national infrastructure could 
cause widespread disruption including large populations suffering 
major power outages, significant business or market disturbance, 
life threatening emergency service outages and long term economic 
damage.”77 
Furthermore, botnets can “be used by governments for 
espionage, infecting and controlling sensitive systems, and 
extracting confidential data.”78 For example, in 2019, a botnet 
 
 73. See Mathew J. Schwartz, Cyber Extortion: Fighting DDoS Attacks, BANK 
INFO SEC. (Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/cyber-extortion-
fighting-ddos-attacks-a-8828 (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (“Attackers disrupt a site 
for a short period with a distributed denial-of-service attack, send a ransom note 
threatening further disruption, and if the ransom doesn’t get paid, sometimes 
make good on that threat.”) [perma.cc/C78L-VTMC]. 
 74. See Ornes, supra note 49 (discussing an October 2016 botnet attack that 
“crippled dozens of websites . . . includ[ing] Amazon, PayPal, Spotify and Twitter” 
and explaining that “[a]ttacked businesses lost money when customers couldn’t 
buy things”). 
 75. See Blair Felter, 5 of the Most Famous Recent DDoS Attacks, VXCHNGE 
(May 31, 2019), https://www.vxchnge.com/blog/recent-ddos-attacks-on-companies 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (naming five famous denial of service attacks which 
targeted companies such as GitHub, Netflix, PayPal, Visa, Amazon, The New 
York Times, Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, Citigroup, and PNC) 
[perma.cc/2ZBL-D43Y]. 
 76. See, e.g., Bradley Barth, DDoS Attacks Delay Trains, Halt 
Transportation Services in Sweden, SC MEDIA (Oct. 16, 2017), 
https://www.scmagazineuk.com/ddos-attacks-delay-trains-halt-transportation-
services-sweden/article/1473963 (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (describing a denial of 
service attack aimed at the Swedish Transport Administration that “crashed the 
IT system that monitors trains’ locations and tells operators when to go or stop”) 
[perma.cc/BJ93-STLL]. 
 77. Ashley Stephenson, Why Critical National Infrastructure Organizations 
Shouldn’t Overlook DDoS Attacks, CORERO NETWORK SEC. (Nov. 5, 2018), 
https://www.corero.com/blog/901-why-critical-national-infrastructure-
organizations-shouldnt-overlook-ddos-attacks.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) 
[perma.cc/9DUZ-P6ZN]. 
 78. Zeitlin, supra note 18, at 751 (citing HELI TIIRMAA-KLAAR, ET. AL., 
BOTNETS, at 12–15 (Sandro Gaycken et al. eds., 2013)); see Tagging and Tracking 
Espionage Botnets, KREBS ON SEC. (July 30, 2012), 
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unleashed malware that targeted United States utility 
companies.79 The malware, nicknamed “LookBack,” infiltrated the 
computers of employees working within the utilities industry 
sector in order “to steal data files and take operational 
screenshots.”80 Though the botnet’s origins were never confirmed, 
APT10, a hacking group backed by China, “is the most likely 
culprit.”81 
Botnets can also be used to influence public opinion in favor of 
the botnet operator’s agenda.82 Russia’s use of botnets to interfere 
with the 2016 presidential election is one prominent example of 
this use,83 but that was not the first time that botnets have been 
used for propaganda.84 The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) 
used botnets to “achieve[] name recognition.”85 After carrying out 
a terrorist attack, ISIS members used Twitter to claim 
responsibility for the attack.86 Then, legions of ISIS-controlled fake 
 
https://krebsonsecurity.com/tag/espionage-botnet/ (discussing “malicious 
software that was developed and deployed specifically for spying on governments, 
activists and industry executives”) [perma.cc/5VK2-HKUE]. 
 79. See Zak Doffman, Chinese State Hackers Suspected of Malicious Cyber 
Attack on U.S. Utilities, FORBES (Aug. 3, 2019, 2:31 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/08/03/chinese-state-hackers-
suspected-of-malicious-cyber-attack-on-u-s-utilities/#43aec8146758 (last visited 
Oct. 10, 2020) (describing the “cyber campaign [that] target[ed] U.S. utility 
companies”) [perma.cc/VH3U-WTB7]. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See What Is a Botnet, supra note 7 (referencing the use of botnets as “tools 
for influencing elections”). 
 83. See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text (discussing the influence of 
Russian botnets in the 2016 presidential election). 
 84. See Moustafa Ayad, Twitter Has Been Flooded with ISIS Propaganda 
Since al Baghdadi’s Death, VICE (Nov. 1, 2019, 1:09 PM), 
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/9kevpp/twitter-has-been-flooded-with-isis-
propaganda-since-al-baghdadis-death (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (“While most of 
the attention has been focused on Russian-backed botnet interference in the 2016 
US elections and the 2016 Brexit vote, ISIS was one of the first terrorist groups 
to pioneer swarming social media with posts from automated and semi-automated 
accounts.”) [perma.cc/8Q3E-GMVZ]. 
 85. Aaron Delwiche & Mary Margaret Herring, ISIS Botnet, PROPAGANDA 
CRITIC (Aug. 8, 2018), https://propagandacritic.com/index.php/case-studies/isis-
botnet/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) [perma.cc/KW7X-AXE4]. 
 86. See id. (discussing how ISIS “leveraged Twitter as a way of taking 
responsibility for successful terrorist attacks”). 
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Twitter accounts retweeted and favorited the messages.87 In this 
way, ISIS “made it highly likely that mainstream media would see 
their content and amplify it even as they condemned it.”88 
III. Hacking Back 
Because of the dangers posed by botnets, the government has 
a significant interest in fighting back against them.89 Since the 
Coreflood takedown, the government has consistently gathered 
victims’ IP addresses in order to enlist the victims’ assistance in 
taking down the botnet by liberating their own machines.90  
This section will describe two takedowns that typify the 
government’s approach, but there are other takedown methods 
that would not require the government to gather IP addresses.91 
These methods, however, require more egregious invasions of the 
victims’ devices.92 For example, instead of contacting the victim in 
order to get her to remove the malware, the government could 
remotely instruct the malware to remove itself.93 
 
 87. See id. (citing Twitter Inc., Combatting Violent Extremism, TWITTER 
BLOG (Feb. 5, 2016), https://blog.twitter.com/official/en_us/a/2016/combating-
violent-extremism.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2020) (explaining how ISIS used “an 
army of bots to create false consensus online”)) [perma.cc/XT6W-RB22]. 
 88. Id. (quoting Renee Diresta, How ISIS and Russia Won Friends and 
Manufactured Crowds, WIRED (Mar. 8, 2018, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/story/isis-russia-manufacture-crowds/ (last visited Oct. 
16, 2020) [perma.cc/82VS-7R2V]. 
 89. See Hong, supra note 48 (“Justice Department officials have urged 
Congress in recent years to modernize the laws that fight cybercrime . . . .”); see 
also Worldwide Threats: Hearing Before the Senate Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Committee, 116th Cong. 5–6 (2019) (statement of 
Christopher Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation) (discussing the 
FBI’s efforts to combat security risks posed by botnets). 
 90. See, e.g., Zetter, supra note 23 (noting that the government collected IP 
addresses in the Coreflood takedown). 
 91. See Zeitlin, supra note 18, at 752–54 (discussing methods for dismantling 
botnets). 
 92. See id. at 754 (explaining that the most intrusive method for fighting 
botnets “involves modifying not just the malware, but the user’s personal software 
as well”). 
 93. See id. at 753 (noting that law enforcement could hack back in order “to 
modify or delete the malware running on infected computers”). 
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A. Centralized Botnets:  Coreflood 
Traditional botnets are centered around one or a few central 
servers, which are identified in the virus’s code.94 In its early 
efforts to fight against botnets, the government generally 
partnered with ISPs in order to remove these servers.95 By 
shutting down a botnet’s domains, the government was able to 
freeze out the operator for a while.96 But the devices comprising 
the botnet remained infected,97 and to regain control, the botnet’s 
operators need only rewrite the botnet’s virus to answer to a new 
set of domain names.98 
In 2011, instead of just shutting down Coreflood’s central 
servers, the government created a “sinkhole.”99 Sinkholing 
reroutes bot “traffic from its original destination to one specified 
by the sinkhole [operator].”100 The revised destination is called a 
 
 94. See Gizzard, et al., supra note 32 (explaining the centralized structure of 
traditional botnets); see also Zack Whittaker, The Sinkhole that Saved the 
Internet, TECHCRUNCH (July 8, 2019, 3:47 PM), 
https://techcrunch.com/2019/07/08/the-wannacry-sinkhole/ (last visited Oct. 16, 
2020) (noting that a botnet was stopped by registering a “web domain found in 
the malware’s code”) [perma.cc/B72Q-MPD9]. 
 95. See Kaplan, supra note 16 (describing the difference between the 
Coreflood takedown and prior botnet takedowns). 
 96. See id. (describing the difference between the Coreflood takedown and 
prior botnet takedowns). 
 97. See United States v. John Doe, No. 3:11-CV-00561, at *3 (D. Conn. 2011) 
(acknowledging that the seizure of Coreflood’s servers would “leave the infected 
computers still running Coreflood”). 
 98. See Kaplan, supra note 16 (explaining that, using the pre-Coreflood 
takedown method, botnets became temporarily defunct, but operators could 
resurrect the botnet by creating “a new hub”); see also Lily Hay Newman, Hacker 
Lexicon: What Is Sinkholing?, WIRED (Jan. 2, 2018, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/story/what-is-sinkholing/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2020) 
(describing a sinkhole that “couldn’t block the malware from being rewritten” in 
a way that would allow the malware to evade the sinkhole) [perma.cc/ZY89-
2QDS]. 
 99. See Lucian Constantin, FBI Remotely Uninstalled Coreflood Malware 
from 19,000 Computers, SOFTPEDIA NEWS (June 22, 2011, 4:29 PM), 
https://news.softpedia.com/news/FBI-Remotely-Uninstalled-Coreflood-Malware-
from-19-000-Computers-207635.shtml (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (noting that, in 
the Coreflood case, the judge “authorized the bureau to set up a sinkhole server”) 
[perma.cc/J94W-YBXK]. 
 100. Margaret Rouse & Matthew Haughn, Definition: Botnet Sinkhole, 
TECHTARGET, https://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/botnet-sinkhole (last 
updated June 2014) (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) [perma.cc/D3K7-V2MS]. 
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sinkhole.101 To prevent the infected machines from continuing to 
run Coreflood’s malware, the government used the sinkhole to 
respond to bots with commands to stop running the malware.102 
Additionally, in order to facilitate the permanent liberation of the 
infected computers, the government used the information gathered 
from the sinkhole to collect the IP addresses of infected computers 
in order to independently locate and notify victims.103 
B. Peer-to-Peer Botnets:  Kelihos 
A traditional botnet’s centralized infrastructure makes it easy 
and efficient for botnet operators to “push commands to, and 
receive information from, infected bots.”104 But, as demonstrated 
by the Coreflood takedown, the centrality of a traditional botnet is 
also its Achilles heel.105 
Cybercriminals have responded to this vulnerability by 
creating peer-to-peer botnets.106 In a peer-to-peer botnet, infected 
computers communicate with each other rather than checking in 
with central servers.107 To facilitate this communication, bots 
regularly exchange “peer lists,” updating each other when new bots 
are added, and warning each other about suspicious bots.108 If a 
 
 101. See id. (“The altered destination is known as the sinkhole.”). 
 102. See Doe, No. 3:11-CV-00561 at *3 (allowing the government to use its 
substitute servers to send stop commands to infected computers). 
 103. See Zetter, supra note 23 (describing the Coreflood takedown).  
 104. Declaration of Special Agent Elliot Peterson in Support of Application for 
an Emergency Restraining Ord. and Ord. to Show Cause Re Preliminary 
Injunction, United States v. Bogachev, No. 2:14-CV-00685 (W.D. Pa. 2014); see 
Gizzard, et. al, supra note 32  (explaining that centralized structures “provide[] 
the attackers with very efficient communication”). 
 105. See Gizzard, supra note 32, at 1 (“The threat of [a centralized] botnet can 
be mitigated and possibly eliminated if the central [server] is incapacitated.”). 
 106. See id. at 1–3 (explaining that peer-to-peer architecture was developed 
in response to centralized botnet takedowns). 
 107. See Michael Mimoso, Peer-to-Peer Botnets Resilient to Takedown 
Attempts, THREAT POST (May 31, 2013, 2:15 PM), https://threatpost.com/peer-to-
peer-botnets-resilient-to-takedown-attempts/100851/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2020) 
(“In Peer-to-Peer botnets, compromised bots talk to each other rather than to a 
central server.”) [perma.cc/5EYP-LSY3]. 
 108. Christian Rossow et al., Modeling and Evaluating the Resilience of Peer-
to-Peer Botnets, 2013 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY, 
https://christian-rossow.de/publications/p2pwned-ieee2013.pdf (last visited Feb. 
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particular bot is compromised, “the gaps in the network are closed 
and the network continues to operate under the control of the 
attacker.”109 
To take down Kelihos, a peer-to-peer botnet, the FBI infected 
its own machines with Kelihos malware and then manipulated 
those newly infected machines into “supernodes.”110 The 
supernodes acted as mini-sinkholes.111 When an infected machine 
contacted a super node, the super node responded with the IP 
address and routing information of an FBI controlled server.112 
Again, the FBI server then recorded the IP addresses of infected 
computers so that the FBI could release that information to the 
victims’ ISPs.113 The ISPs then told victims about the infection and 
helped them remove the malware.114 
IV. The Privacy Implications of Hacking Back 
Despite the dangers posed by botnets, the invasiveness of 
takedown efforts raises privacy concerns.115 When private parties 
use sinkholes, many of these concerns are addressed by the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).116 The CFAA is a federal 
 
20, 2020) (“All [peer-to-peer] botnets implement the concept of peer lists to keep 
track of neighboring peers.”) [perma.cc/7CJU-BRST]. 
 109. Gizzard, supra note 32. 
 110. See Aliya Sternstein, FBI Allays Some Critics with First Use of New 
Mass-Hacking Warrant, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 24, 2017, 2:44 PM), 
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/04/fbi-allays-some-critics-with-first-use-
of-new-mass-hacking-warrant/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2020) (describing the Kelihos 
takedown) [perma.cc/N6GW-3CN6]. 
 111. See id. (describing the Kelihos takedown). 
 112. See id. (describing the Kelihos takedown). 
 113. See Affidavit in Support of an Application Under Rule 41 for a Search 
Warrant at 2, No. 3:18-MJ-0024-DMS (D. Alaska Apr. 5, 2017) (explaining the 
government’s method to take down Kelihos). 
 114. See id. (explaining the government’s method to take down Kelihos); see 
also Sternstein, supra note 110 (same). 
 115. See Zeitlin, supra note 18, at 756 (noting that government takedown 
efforts “intrude on private computers,” and thus “raise[] legal and ethical 
concerns”). 
 116. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2018) (prohibiting individuals from 
“accessing a computer without authorization” in order to gain information from 
the computer’s user); 18 U.S.C. §  1030(a)(5)(B)–(C) (2018) (establishing criminal 
liability for individuals who “intentionally access a protected computer without 
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statute that criminalizes intentional, unauthorized access to 
computers and networks.117 
However, the CFAA does not apply to law enforcement 
agencies.118 Instead, the privacy concerns implicated by 
government takedown efforts should be analyzed under the Fourth 
Amendment.119 The Fourth Amendment provides that 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.120 
Often, the Fourth Amendment is contemplated through the 
prism of the suppression of evidence in criminal cases.121 But the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment are not cabined to protecting 
individuals from having evidence used against them in courts.122 
Indeed, the “wrong condemned by the Amendment is ‘fully 
 
authorization” when that access causes damage or loss); see also Zeitlin, supra 
note 18, at 756–57 (explaining the CFAA’s protections, which limit private uses 
of sinkholing). 
 117. See Kim Zetter, Hacker Lexicon:  What Is the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act?, WIRED (Nov. 28, 2014, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/11/hacker-
lexicon-computer-fraud-abuse-act/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2020) (describing the 
CFAA as “a federal anti-hacking statute that prohibits unauthorized access to 
computers and networks”) [perma.cc/HY2E-7GFD]. 
 118. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(f) (2018) (“This section does not prohibit any 
lawfully authorized investigative, protective, or intelligence activity of a law 
enforcement agency of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision of a 
State, or of an intelligence agency of the United States.”).  
 119. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. (“The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated . . . .”); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) 
(specifying that the Fourth Amendment’s “protection applies to governmental 
action”). 
 120. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 121. See Adam M. Gershowitz, The Post-Riley Search Warrant, 69 VAND. L. 
REV. 585, 590 (2016) (“In standard Fourth Amendment caselaw, the question of 
whether a search warrant is properly executed is litigated after the search is 
conducted.”). 
 122. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. (protecting “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures”); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) 
(explaining that the Fourth Amendment is not merely a tool for suppressing 
evidence). 
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accomplished’ by the unlawful [invasion] itself.”123 By suppressing 
the ill-begotten evidence, a court cannot “cure the invasion of the 
defendant’s rights which he has already suffered.”124 Instead, 
suppression merely serves to deter law enforcement from future 
Fourth Amendment violations.125 
Botnet takedowns offend the Fourth Amendment rights of the 
owners of infected devices. These owners are not suspects in the 
botnet investigation and will not face prosecution. Thus, any 
evidence procured from the Fourth Amendment violations would 
not be used against them in court. 
At first glance, it may seem that an analysis of the Fourth 
Amendment implications of botnet takedowns is only an academic 
exercise. If the invasion does not result in evidence that could be 
used against the owner, maybe the invasion does not matter. 
Furthermore, owners generally have an interest in eradicating the 
infection because it may slow down their device or compromise 
their data.126 Perhaps it seems harsh to limit law enforcement’s 
ability to help owners by asserting the owners’ Fourth Amendment 
rights. 
But to turn a blind eye to such intrusions would sanction 
government overreach.  
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect 
liberty when the government’s purposes are beneficent. Men 
born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their 
liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty 
lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning 
but without understanding.127 
 
 123. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (quoting United States 
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974)). 
 124. Id. (citations omitted). 
 125. See id. (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348) (noting that the exclusionary 
rule “operates as a ‘judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth 
Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal 
constitutional right of the party aggrieved’”). 
 126. See Jonathan Strickland, How to Fix Your Zombie Computer, HOW STUFF 
WORKS, https://electronics.howstuffworks.com/how-to-tech/how-to-fix-zombie-
computer1.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2020) (explaining that botnets can slow down 
an infected computer) [perma.cc/W2XD-CYU2]. 
 127. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 477 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
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V. Search:  The Collection of IP Addresses 
A. “The Technology We Exalt Today Is Everyman’s Master” 
For purposes of the Fourth Amendment, government conduct 
is a search if it meets the criteria of either the Katz128 “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” analysis or the trespass test.129 Courts have 
not had occasion to consider the government’s collection of IP 
addresses in the context of botnet takedowns. But courts have 
considered this question in another context:  The government’s use 
of Network Investigative Techniques (NIT).130 
In the most prominent examples of these cases, the Playpen 
cases, the government embedded malware into a child porn site.131 
When a user visited the site, the malware would infect her 
computer and report her IP address to the government.132 In many 
of the Playpen cases, courts determined that no search had 
occurred.133 It is easy enough to accept those Playpen decisions 
because the defendants are unsympathetic as “victims” of a search. 
“But every person is the victim, for the technology we exalt today 
is everyman’s master.”134 
 
 128.  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (holding that “the 
‘trespass doctrine’ can no longer be regarded as controlling”). 
 129. See Florida v. Jardines, 596 U.S. 1, 5 (2013) (explaining that the Katz 
definition of search “add[s] to the baseline, it does not subtract anything from the 
Amendment’s protections ‘when the government does engage in a physical 
intrusion of a constitutionally protected area’” (quoting United States v. Knotts, 
460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983))); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406–07, 409 
(2012) (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)); United States v. 
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 278 (1983); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 176 
(1969) (explaining that the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy test has been 
added to, not substituted for the common-law trespassory test”). 
 130. See Kaleigh E. Aucoin, Note, The Spider’s Parlor:  Government Malware 
on the Dark Web, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 1433, 1449–50 (2018) (discussing motions to 
suppress evidence gathered through NIT). 
 131. See id. at 1449 (explaining the FBI’s tactics in Playpen and stating that, 
although the FBI had employed similar tactics before, the Playpen cases were 
particularly controversial “because a single warrant led to an estimated collection 
of IP addresses ranging somewhere in the thousands”). 
 132. See id. at 1446 (explaining how malware infects a device). 
 133. See id. at 1442, 1450–51 (explaining how the government uses NIT and 
stating that the government “deploy[ed] a NIT to any person’s computer who 
logged into Playpen regardless of where they logged in from”). 
 134. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 757 (1971) (Douglas, J., 
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Online companies use IP addresses to “know exactly what 
devices (and users) are utilizing their services.”135 An IP address is 
more than simply the address where you receive an email.136 It can 
be used to track your very movements.137 In the future, in the 
interconnected world, almost all tangible items will have an IP 
address.138 Not only cars and phones will be traceable, but 
children, dogs, books (if they still exist), food, almost everything 
will have an IP address.139 To allow the government to have 
unfettered access to our every movement is unfathomable. Those 
judicial decisions that fail to recognize the centrality of the IP 
address to our every movement are relics of a pre-interconnected 
world. 
This Note argues that, in cases of botnet takedowns, the 
government’s collection of IP addresses is a search under both the 
Katz test and the trespass test. To demonstrate the inevitable 
dangers of a different conclusion, this section will trace Supreme 
Court jurisprudence as it pertains to technology. 
B. Katz:  A Beacon of Hope? 
The rise of technology has exacerbated the already difficult 
question of what constitutes a Fourth Amendment search. In the 
first era of search law, courts held that there could be no Fourth 
Amendment search without a physical intrusion of a 
constitutionally protected area.140 In 1967, faced with a case of 
 
dissenting). 
 135. GOODMAN, supra note 46, at 66. 
 136. See id. at 54 (explaining that IP addresses are “exploited to give internet 
companies and their advertisers a clear and persistent look at you and your online 
activities”). 
 137. See id. at 209 (explaining how IP addresses aid in the surveillance of 
online activities). 
 138. Id. at 287; see What Is an IP Address?, AVAST ACAD., 
https://www.avast.com/c-what-is-an-ip-address (last updated Feb. 6, 2020) (last 
visited Oct. 16, 2020) (“Every single device that is connected to the internet has 
an IP address.”) [perma.cc/7DH3-U2Z6]. 
 139. See GOODMAN, supra note 46, at 287 (“We can think of today’s internet 
as the size of a golf ball. Tomorrow’s will be the size of the sun.”). 
 140. See JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: 
INVESTIGATING CRIME 95 (6th ed. 2017) (explaining that early search law used a 
property-based approach). 
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electronic eavesdropping, the Supreme Court kicked off a new era 
of search law.141 
In Katz, government agents installed an electronic listening 
device to the outside of a telephone booth that the defendant used 
to place his calls.142 The government asserted that no search had 
occurred because the phone booth was not a constitutionally 
protected area and agents had not physically penetrated the phone 
booth.143 
Eschewing a strict adherence to the trespass doctrine, the 
Court instead focused on privacy.144 The Court declined to decide 
whether or not the phonebooth was constitutionally protected, 
noting that  
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a 
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home 
or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But 
what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible 
to the public, may be constitutionally protected.145 
Turning next to the issue of physical intrusion, the Court 
determined that “the reach of [the Fourth] Amendment cannot 
turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any 
given enclosure.”146 
The Court held that a Fourth Amendment search had 
occurred, and in his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan articulated 
a two-prong test that has since “become the primary standard for 
determining whether police conduct constitutes a search:”147 
“[F]irst, that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that 
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”148 
 
 141. See id. at 96 (noting that the “second period of ‘search’ law” began with 
Katz). 
 142. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967) (providing the facts 
of the case). 
 143. See id. at 351–54 (noting the government’s arguments). 
 144. See id. at 351 (noting that the government can violate an individual’s 
Fourth Amendment right to privacy without committing a physical trespass). 
 145. Id. at 351. 
 146. Id. at 353. 
 147. DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 140, at 102. 
 148. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
KEEPING THE ZOMBIES AT BAY  383 
The new approach was attractive in part because of its 
flexibility, which alleviated concerns about how the government 
could use technology to circumvent the stringent requirements of 
the trespass doctrine.149 For example, in Kyllo v. United States,150 
a government agent used a thermal-imaging device to establish 
that the defendant was using heat lamps to grow marijuana in his 
home.151 It has long been accepted that the Fourth Amendment’s 
protections of the home are especially powerful.152 Nonetheless, 
this egregious invasion slips through the cracks of the trespass 
doctrine. 
Though the device was aimed at a constitutionally protected 
area (a private home), there was no physical intrusion.153 The 
agent operated the device from a public street,154 and the device 
picked up heat emanating from the outer surface of the house.155 
Noting that “in the case of the interior of homes . . . there is ready 
criterion, with roots deep in the common law, of the minimal 
 
 149. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 748 (1971) 
Until Katz v. United States, neither wiretapping nor electronic 
eavesdropping violated a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights 
‘unless there has been an official search and seizure of his person, or 
such a seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects, or an 
actual physical invasion of his house or curtilage for the purpose of 
making a seizure. 
(quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928); Goldman v. United 
States, 316 U.S. 129, 135–36 (1942)).  
 150. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 41 (2001) (holding that 
“[w]here  .  .  .  the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to 
explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without 
physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively 
unreasonable without a warrant”). 
 151. See id. at 29 (providing the facts of Kyllo). 
 152. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589–90 (1980) (“[A]t the very core 
[of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home 
and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” (quoting Silverman 
v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961))); Florida v. Jardines, 596 U.S. 1, 5 
(2013) (“When it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is first among 
equals.”). 
 153. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35 (noting that “a thermal imager captures only 
heat emanating from a house”). 
 154. See id. at 30 (“The scan of Kyllo’s home  .  .  .  was performed from the 
passenger seat of Agent Elliott's vehicle across the street from the front of the 
house and also from the street in back of the house.”). 
 155. See id. (noting that the device could not penetrate the surface of the 
house). 
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expectation of privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged to be 
reasonable,”156 the Court held that the Katz reasonableness test is 
automatically satisfied if the government uses technology that is 
not widely available to the public in order to obtain information 
about the interior of the home.157 
When viewed in light of the Kyllo holding, it seems as though 
the government has performed a search if it retrieves information 
from an individual’s infected device. The precise language does 
cabin the rule to investigations aimed at private homes. But the 
government cannot ensure that a sinkhole will only capture public 
IP addresses.158 The sinkhole will capture the addresses of any 
computer infected with the malware.159 That could be a device 
located in a public area, but it could also be a home computer, a 
home’s smart refrigerator, or a home’s Echo device—anything that 
contains the botnet’s malware.160 
Furthermore, the Court has indicated that, because of the 
amount of information stored on cell phones and computers, 
privacy expectations on those devices are tantamount to those of a 
home.161 Thus, it is reasonable to assume the Kyllo holding would 
extend to an individual’s laptop or cellphone even if, at the time of 
 
 156. Id. 
 157. See id. at 34 (“We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology 
any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have 
been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,’ 
constitutes a search—at least where . . . the technology in question is not in 
general public use.”). 
 158. See Rouse, supra note 100 (explaining how a sinkhole works). 
 159. See Markus Rauschecker, Symposium Essays from the State of Cyberlaw:  
Security and Privacy in the Digital Age: Rule 41 Amendments Provide for a 
Drastic Expansion of Government Authority to Conduct Computer Searches and 
Should Not Have Been Adopted by the Supreme Court, 76 MD. L. REV. 1085, 1085 
(2017) (explaining that, “if a target location of a computer is unknown,” the 
government cannot know where the search will occur). 
 160. See supra notes 99–103 and accompanying text (defining sinkholing and 
explaining how it can be used to take down a botnet). 
 161. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 396–97 (2014)  
[A] cell phone search would typically expose to the government far 
more than the most exhaustive search of a house: A phone not only 
contains in digital form many sensitive records previously found in the 
home; it also contains a broad array of private information never found 
in a home in any form—unless the phone is. 
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the government’s hack back,162 the individual had carried that 
device into a public area. 
But, when it comes to technology, the Katz application is not 
as privacy-friendly as it seems. “[U]nsurprisingly, those ‘actual 
(subjective) expectations of privacy’ ‘that society is prepared to 
recognize as ‘reasonable,’’ bear an uncanny resemblance to those 
expectations of privacy that this Court considers reasonable.”163 In 
application, Katz birthed two doctrines that have not aged well in 
modern times.164 
1. The Third-Party Doctrine 
Under the third-party doctrine, “a person has no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in information that he voluntarily turns over 
to third parties.”165 Federal courts have frequently invoked the 
third-party doctrine to hold that an IP address does not meet the 
Katz test.166 This section argues that the notion that an IP address 
is not subject to search because it falls under the third-party 
doctrine is dated, not only according to recent caselaw, but by 
technological advances. 
The rationale behind the third-party doctrine is that, by 
conveying information to a third party, an individual assumes the 
risk that the third party will convey that information to the 
government.167 This rationale takes on a particularly sinister vibe 
 
 162. Hacking back is a term that some cyber-savvy individuals use to describe 
retaliation efforts against hackers, such as those described in Section II.   
 163. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 164. See discussion infra Sections IV.B.1, IV.B.2 (discussing the third-party 
doctrine and the binary search doctrine). 
 165. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (citations omitted). 
 166. See United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 573 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Federal 
courts have uniformly held that ‘subscriber information provided to an internet 
provider is not protected by the Fourth Amendment’s privacy expectation’ 
because it is voluntarily conveyed to third parties.” (quoting United States v. 
Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1204 (10th Cir. 2008))). But see United States v. Hachey, 
Criminal No. 16-0128, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34192, at *18 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 
2017) (refusing to apply the third-party doctrine to the government’s collection of 
IP addresses). 
 167. See Elspeth A. Brotherton, Comment, Big Brother Gets a Makeover: 
Behavioral Targeting and the Third-Party Doctrine, 61 EMORY L.J. 555, 574–75 
(2012) (explaining the assumption of risk rationale behind the third-party 
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when considered in light of ever-advancing technology.168 In early 
cases, the Court was generally apathetic to these concerns. 
The roots of the third-party doctrine come from a line of “false 
friend” cases.169 False friend cases can be divided into two 
categories:  “[P]ure false friend” and “wired false friend.”170 In a 
pure false friend case, the defendant privately makes statements 
to an individual who turns out to be a government informant.171 
The false friend then relays that information to the government.172 
In a wired false friend case, the informant wears a device that 
records or electronically transmits the information to law 
enforcement.173 Before Katz, the Court routinely found no Fourth 
Amendment violation regardless of whether the false friend was 
wired.174 Under the pre-Katz, property-based approach to search 
law, it makes sense not to distinguish between wired and pure.175 
But the Court also articulated an additional rationale:  
Assumption of risk.176 
In United States v. White,177 a post-Katz wired false-friend 
case, a plurality of the Court seized upon that assumption of risk 
rationale and merged it into the objective prong of Katz:  An 
 
doctrine). 
 168. See id. at 577 (“Legal commentators generally disagree with the 
soundness of the doctrine, criticizing the Court's understanding of what 
constitutes ‘reasonable’ expectations of privacy as out of touch with reality.”). 
 169. See id. at 574–75 (discussing the evolution of the third-party doctrine). 
 170. See JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE, VOL. 1: INVESTIGATION 81–82 (6th ed. 2016) (describing the two 
categories of false friend cases). 
 171. See id. at 82 (providing a basic “pure false friend” fact pattern).  
 172. See id. (providing a basic “pure false friend” fact pattern). 
 173. See id. (providing a basic “wired false friend” fact pattern). 
 174. See id. at 84 (“Prior to Katz, the fact that a false friend was ‘wired’ with 
a transmitter or tape recorder was irrelevant to ‘search’ analysis.”). 
 175. See id. (“As long as the agent did not trespass, no search occurred.”). 
 176. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (holding that the 
defendant could not invoke the Fourth Amendment to prevent his false friend 
from testifying against him and noting that the Fourth Amendment does not 
“protect[] a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily 
confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it”); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 
438 (1963) (holding that the defendant’s statements, which had been tape 
recorded by a false friend, were not the product of a search and noting that the 
defendant “knew full well” that those statements “could be used against him”). 
 177. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 750 (1971) (holding that Katz did 
not disturb the Court’s previous false friend decisions). 
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individual cannot have a legitimate, constitutionally protected 
expectation that a person he speaks to will not reveal the 
conversation to the police.178 According to the White Court, there is 
no constitutional difference between a pure false friend and a 
wired false friend.179 Harlan, the author of the Katz test, wrote a 
fiery dissent.180 Harlan agreed that Katz left pure false friend cases 
undisturbed, but, citing Orwellian concerns, he urged that wired 
false friend cases should be overturned.181  
In United States v. Miller,182 the seminal third-party case,183 
the Court extended the assumption of risk rationale to apply to 
information conveyed to a third-party entity.184 Upholding the 
warrantless search of a defendant’s banking records, the Court 
 
 178. See id. at 751  
If the conduct and revelations of an agent operating without electronic 
equipment do not invade the defendant’s constitutionally justifiable 
expectations of privacy, neither does a simultaneous recording of the 
same conversations made by the agent or by others from transmissions 
received from the agent to whom the defendant is talking and whose 
trustworthiness the defendant necessarily risks. 
 179. The Court explains that the Fourth Amendment does not require the 
suppression of evidence in pure false friend cases and states that 
For constitutional purposes, no different result is required if the 
agent . . . either (1) simultaneously records them with electronic 
equipment which he is carrying on his person (2) or carries radio 
equipment which simultaneously transmits the conversations either to 
recording equipment located elsewhere or to other agents monitoring 
the transmitting frequency. 
Id. at 751. 
 180. See id. at 769–95 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (urging that Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence had moved away from the rationale of previous wired 
false friend cases). 
 181. See id. at 777 (“[I]t is one thing to subject the average citizen to the risk 
that participants in a conversation with him will subsequently divulge its 
contents to another, but quite a different matter to foist upon him the risk that 
unknown third parties may be simultaneously listening in.”). 
 182. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)  
The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information 
revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government 
authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that 
it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in 
the third party will not be betrayed. 
 183. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018) (“The 
third-party doctrine largely traces its roots to Miller.”). 
 184. See Brotherton, supra note 168, at 574–75 (tracing Miller’s assumption 
of risk rationale to the false friend cases). 
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stated that “[t]he depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs 
to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to 
the Government.”185 
In Smith v. Maryland,186 the Court extended the rationale 
even further. In that case, the government asked a phone company 
to install a pen register in order to record the numbers that the 
defendant dialed from his home telephone.187 The Court 
determined that the defendant’s privacy interest in outgoing phone 
numbers did not meet the objective prong of Katz.188 To reach this 
holding, the Court reasoned that “all telephone users realize that 
they must ‘convey’ phone numbers to the telephone company,” and 
thus those numbers are covered by the third-party doctrine.189 
According to the Court, the fact that the information was conveyed 
to a switchboard, rather than a telephone operator, was 
immaterial to a third-party doctrine analysis.190 
Although Miller and Smith ostensibly rely on an assumption 
of risk rationale, those cases’ broad conception of “voluntariness” 
seem to undermine that rationale’s logic.191 Can an individual 
really be charged with volunteering to provide information if 
providing such information is nearly a requirement of modern 
life?192 This broad conception of the third-party doctrine is “ill 
suited for the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of 
information about themselves to third parties in the course of 
carrying out mundane tasks.”193 
 
 185. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443. 
 186. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (holding that the defendant 
had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers he dialed 
because he “voluntarily conveyed that information to the telephone company”). 
 187. See id. at 737 (providing the facts of the case). 
 188. See id. at 744 (“[E]ven if petitioner did harbor some subjective 
expectation that the phone numbers he dialed would remain private, this 
expectation is not ‘one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.’” 
(quoting Katz, 389 U.S., at 361)). 
 189. Id. at 742. 
 190. See id. at 745 (“We are not inclined to hold that a different constitutional 
result is required because the telephone company has decided to automate.”). 
 191. See id. at 750 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“It is idle to speak of ‘assuming’ 
risks in contexts where, as a practical matter, individuals have no realistic 
alternative.”). 
 192. See id. at 749 (“Implicit in the concept of assumption of risk is some 
notion of choice.”). 
 193. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
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In Carpenter v. United States,194 the Court narrowed the scope 
of the third-party doctrine. In that case, the government obtained 
cell-site tracking information from the defendant’s wireless 
carriers.195 Rejecting the government’s argument that the 
information was covered by the third-party doctrine, the Court 
articulated two rationales behind the doctrine and determined that 
neither rationale was satisfied.196 
First, the Court stated that “[t]he third-party doctrine partly 
stems from the notion that an individual has a reduced expectation 
of privacy in information knowingly shared with another.”197 The 
Court stated that this rationale required an inspection of the 
nature of the information.198 This notion, that there is a qualitative 
consideration embedded in the third-party doctrine, was not a 
proper application of Miller and Smith.199 Although those cases 
indeed noted the quality of the information procured, “the fact that 
information was relinquished to a third party was the entire basis 
for concluding that the defendants in those cases lacked a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.”200 Nonetheless, the Carpenter 
Court focused on the accuracy and detail of cell site location 
information, noting that “when Smith was decided in 1979, few 
could have imagined a society in which a phone goes wherever its 
owner goes, conveying to the wireless carrier not just dialed digits, 
but a detailed and comprehensive record of the person’s 
movements.”201 
Next, the Court turned to the notion of “voluntary exposure” 
(i.e. assumption of risk).202 The Court noted that the use of a cell 
 
concurring). 
 194. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018) (holding 
that cell site location information is not covered by the third-party doctrine). 
 195. See id. at 2211 (providing the facts of the case). 
 196. See id. at 2210 (explaining the rationales behind the third-party 
doctrine). 
 197. Id. 
 198. See id. (emphasizing that the opinions in Smith and Miller took note of 
the nature of the information). 
 199. See id. at 2231 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority 
opinion misinterprets Miller and Smith). 
 200. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2232 (2018) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). 
 201. Id. at 2217. 
 202. Id.; see also Brotherton, supra note 202 at 577–78 (discussing the 
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phone is “indispensable to participation in modern society.”203 
Further noting that the data was recorded “without any 
affirmative act on the part of the user beyond powering up,” the 
Court determined that the cell phone user had not meaningfully 
“assum[ed] the risk” of disclosing the data.204 
Applying Miller and Smith would seem to indicate that, like 
the banking records and pen register information at issue in those 
cases, an IP address would not be the type of information that 
would require a warrant. By merely having an IP address, an 
individual has voluntarily turned her IP address over to her ISP, 
thus waiving her right to privacy of that information. 
In a post-Carpenter world, however, the analysis is less clear. 
By focusing on the necessity of cell phones, the Carpenter opinion 
ostensibly revitalizes a true voluntariness requirement.205 
However, the opinion does not overturn Miller, and as the dissent 
points out, carrying a cell phone is no more of a necessity than 
having a bank account.206 Thus, it is possible that the Court’s 
primary concern was the sheer amount of information contained in 
the cell site data. Regardless, Carpenter illustrates that the Court 
is prepared to alter doctrine, and perhaps even abandon it, to stay 
current with the times, or at least to appear to do so.207 
An IP address, like a cell phone, is a necessity of life in the 
modern world.208 Thus, under a Carpenter analysis, the 
voluntariness requirement is not met.209 Furthermore, although IP 
 
relationship between “volunteered” information and assumption of risk). 
 203. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (2018). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. (noting that cell phones are a necessity of modern life and refusing to 
hold that cell site location information, though held by a third party, is subject to 
the third-party doctrine). 
 206. See id. at 2232 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that using a bank 
account is “no more or less necessary than the decision whether to use a cell 
phone”). 
 207. See id. at 2220 (limiting the third-party doctrine by excluding cell site 
location information). 
 208. See GOODMAN, supra note 138 (discussing the operation and ubiquity of 
IP addresses). 
 209. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (2018) (noting that the third-party 
doctrine covers information that is voluntarily shared); see also Brotherton, supra 
note 202, at 577–78 (discussing the relationship between “volunteered” 
information and the third-party doctrine). 
KEEPING THE ZOMBIES AT BAY  391 
addresses are currently not as revealing as cell site locations, 
predictions about the interconnectedness of the future digital 
universe indicate that IP addresses would be more ubiquitous than 
cell phones—and provide abundant information about almost 
everything.210 The new IP allows for so many internet connections 
“that within the coming years, not only will every computer, phone, 
and tablet be online, but so too will every car, house, dog, bridge, 
tunnel, cup, clock, pacemaker, cow, streetlight, pipeline, toy, and 
soda can.”211 Everything and everybody will be connected.212 In 
that world the Justices will very likely blanche at the notion of the 
government possessing such information. 
2. The Binary Search Doctrine 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that society is 
not willing to legitimize an individual’s privacy interest in 
contraband.213 And thus, under the binary search doctrine, 
“government conduct that only reveals the possession of 
contraband” is not a search because it does not compromise an 
expectation of “privacy that society is prepared to consider 
reasonable.”214 
When a botnet takedown reports a victim’s IP address to the 
government, it tells the government only that that computer is 
infected with illegal malware.215 Thus, it might seem alluring to 
slap the binary search doctrine onto the conduct and call it a day. 
But extending the binary search doctrine to “obtain identifying 
information” turns the doctrine on its head.216 
 
 210. See GOODMAN, supra note 46, at 288 (discussing the future 
interconnectedness of the Internet of Things). 
 211. Id. at 287. 
 212. See id. (noting that, in the future, virtually everything will be connected 
to the internet and capable of sharing information). 
 213. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005) (“We have held that any 
interest in possessing contraband cannot be deemed legitimate . . . .”); see also 
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984) (“A chemical test that merely 
discloses whether or not a particular substance is cocaine does not compromise 
any legitimate interest in privacy.”). 
 214. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408–09 (citing Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 122, 123). 
 215. See Zeitlin, supra note 18, at 752 (describing the processes involved in a 
botnet takedown). 
 216. See Meyer, supra note 47, at 608 (“Government hacking to obtain 
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To illustrate, consider a dog sniffing luggage in an airport, the 
archetypal application of the binary search doctrine.217 The dog 
alerts to a particular individual’s luggage, letting the officer know 
that the individual has drugs in her bag.218 Under the binary 
search doctrine, the individual has not been searched.219 
Now, consider another example. A police officer, sitting at the 
police station, suspects that there are people in America walking 
down the street with marijuana in their pockets. Luckily for him, 
the police officer has a piece of technology which allows him to 
press a button and learn the location of every individual who is 
carrying marijuana. Does the binary search doctrine still apply? 
The latter hypothetical seems absurd, but it demonstrates the 
dangers of contorting the binary search doctrine to cover the 
government’s collection of IP addresses in botnet takedowns. What 
if the government could press a button and learn the IP address of 
every computer in America that contains illegally downloaded 
music files?220 That is a very real possibility.221 
To comport with the established application of the binary 
search doctrine, as demonstrated in the first hypothetical, the 
government would need to know a potential botnet victim’s 
individual IP address, then use technology which simply reported 
back whether or not that individual’s device was indeed infected.222 
In other words, a binary search can only answer one question:  Yes 
or No? It should not be extended to cover:  No or Yes—and here is 
where to find them.223 
 
identifying information . . . does not implicate the Fourth Amendment's exception 
for contraband. There is nothing inherently unlawful about an IP address.”). 
 217. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 687–68 (1983). 
 218. Id. 
 219. See id. at 707 (concluding that exposing someone’s luggage to a drug 
sniffing dog does not constitute a search). 
 220. See Meyer, supra note 47, at 613–14 (“Are we prepared for a society in 
which, at the press of a button, the government could constitutionally hack and 
identify millions of Americans who have committed mundane misdemeanors?”). 
 221. See id. at 614 (“This is no thought experiment: [T]he technology is 
straightforward and exists today.”). 
 222. See id. at 608 (“Government hacking to obtain identifying 
information . . . does not implicate the Fourth Amendment’s exception for 
contraband. There is nothing inherently unlawful about an IP address.”). 
 223. See id. (explaining that the binary search doctrine applies only to 
“technique[s] that solely indicate[] the presence or absence of contraband”). 
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C. It’s Alive!:  The Resurrection of the Trespass Doctrine 
For a time, the Katz analysis seemed to have replaced the 
trespass doctrine entirely.224 Fact patterns that satisfy the 
trespass test usually also satisfy the Katz analysis.225 Take the 
paradigmatic trespassory search, in which a police officer breaks 
into a home looking for evidence:  Such conduct would of course 
meet the trespass test, but it would also readily meet the Katz 
expectation of privacy analysis.226 Thus, at first glance, it seems 
that Katz would cover any circumstance that the trespass doctrine 
would have covered and then some. But the binary search and 
third-party doctrine create opportunities for the government to use 
technology to collect information without meeting the Katz 
analysis.  
Worry not. In 2012, forty-five years after Katz, the Supreme 
Court made an important clarification:  Katz is a supplement to, 
and not a replacement of, the trespass doctrine.227 This revelation 
comes courtesy of another electronic surveillance case, Jones v. 
United States.228 
In Jones, the government put a tracking device on the 
defendant’s car and monitored his movements for weeks.229 The 
government arguably had precedent on its side. In two “beeper 
 
 224. See DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 140, at 160 (describing Jones as “the 
return of the trespass doctrine to the ‘search’ analysis”). 
 225. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 407–08 (2012)  
We have embodied [the] preservation of past [property] rights in our 
very definition of ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ which we have 
said to be an expectation that has a source outside of the Fourth 
Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal 
property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted 
by society. 
 226. See Zeitlin, supra note 18, at 771 (explaining that the trespass doctrine 
and the Katz analysis are often overlapping). 
 227. Jones, 565 U.S. at 406–07, 409. 
 228. See id. at 404 (“We hold that the Government’s installation of a GPS 
device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s 
movements, constitutes a ‘search.’”). 
 229. See id. at 403 (providing the facts of the case). 
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cases,” Knotts230 and Karo,231 the Court determined that no search 
had occurred when the government used an electronic beeper to 
track a defendant’s movements on public roads.232 In Knotts, the 
government implanted a beeper into a can that would be purchased 
by the defendant.233 In Karo, the government agents “substituted 
their own can containing a beeper for one of the cans” that was to 
be shipped to the defendant.234 Citing the “beeper cases,” the 
government attempted to rely on the third-party doctrine, arguing 
that “Jones had no ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ in the area 
of the Jeep accessed by Government agents (its underbody) and the 
locations of the Jeep on public roads, which were visible to all.”235 
Insisting that “Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall 
with the Katz formulation,” the Court declined to address the 
government’s Katz expectation of privacy argument.236 Instead, the 
Court announced that “Katz did not narrow the Fourth 
Amendment’s scope” and the trespass doctrine was alive and 
well.237 The Court pointed out that there was one important 
distinction between Jones and the prior beeper cases:  In Jones, the 
government trespassed.238 In both Knotts and Karo, the 
government installed the beepers into the cans before they came 
into the defendants’ possession.239 On the other hand, the 
defendant in Jones owned his car at the time of the installation.240 
 
 230. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (holding that “a 
person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfare has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his movements”). 
 231. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984) (holding that the 
information gained from the beeper when it was within the defendant’s private 
residence was a search but that the evidence gained when he was on public streets 
was not a search). 
 232. See Knotts, 460 U.S at 281 (stating that the defendant did not have an 
“expectation of privacy” for his movements on public roads); see also Karo, 468 
U.S. at 714 (noting that an individual cannot expect for his public actions to be 
private). 
 233. See Knotts, 460 U.S at 277 (providing the facts of the case). 
 234. See Karo, 468 U.S. at 708 (providing the facts of the case). 
 235. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012). 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. at 408.  
 238. See id. at 408–10 (distinguishing Jones from Knotts and Karo). 
 239. See id. (distinguishing Jones from Knotts and Karo). 
 240. See id. (noting that Jones “is on much different footing” than Knotts and 
Karo because Jones owned the car “at the time the Government trespassorily 
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In Florida v. Jardines,241 the Supreme Court considered 
whether a Fourth Amendment search had occurred when police 
officers brought a drug-sniffing dog onto the defendant’s porch.242 
The dog alerted to the smell of drugs, and police used the 
information obtained from the dog to get a warrant to search the 
defendant’s home.243 
The only information sought through the use of the 
drug-sniffing dog was whether or not the defendant had illegal 
narcotics in his home.244 Thus, the Court could arguably have 
applied the binary search doctrine and determined that no Fourth 
Amendment search had occurred. Instead, lauding the trespass 
doctrine for “keep[ing] easy cases easy,” the Court stated that the 
fact that “the officers learned what they learned only by physically 
intruding on [the defendant’s] property to gather evidence is 
enough to establish that a search occurred.”245 
Jones and Jardines clarify that when the government 
physically intrudes on a constitutionally protected area for the 
purpose of gaining information, a Fourth Amendment search has 
occurred, regardless of whether or not the information sought is 
“private.”246 Thus, even if an IP address is not “private” under a 
Katz analysis, the process the government uses to gather that 
information might be a search under the trespass test.  
Obviously, the information-gathering requirement is satisfied 
by the collection of IP addresses. Furthermore, the infected devices 
are likely to be in homes or other constitutionally protected 
areas.247 And, even if the device is not in a constitutionally 
 
inserted the information-gathering device”). 
 241. See Florida v. Jardines, 596 U.S. 1, 7 (2013) (determining that a Fourth 
Amendment search had occurred because the government had conducted an 
investigation in a constitutionally protected area and the investigation was 
“accomplished by an unlicensed physical intrusion”). 
 242. Id. at 3–4. 
 243. Id. at 4. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. at 11. 
 246. See id. at 5, 9 (Brennan, J., concurring) (outlining the trespass test (citing 
Jones, 565 U.S. at 406–07 n.3; United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983))).  
 247. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018) (“A cell 
phone faithfully follows its owner beyond public thoroughfares and into private 
residences, doctor’s offices, political headquarters, and other potentially revealing 
locales.”). 
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protected area, the device itself is likely to be a cell phone or 
computer, and the Court has indicated that the constitutional 
protections extended to cell phones and computers are tantamount 
to the protections afforded to the home.248 
The sticking point in a trespass-based analysis of a botnet 
takedown is whether or not there has been a physical intrusion.249 
The question of whether the government’s use of malware to learn 
an IP address constitutes a search has generally been considered 
in NIT cases, where the government planted the malware in the 
computer in the first place.250 In such cases, courts have been 
inconsistent in their trespass analysis, highlighting the difficulties 
of applying the trespass doctrine in the digital world.251 But the 
best answer is that implanting malware is a physical intrusion, 
albeit a tiny one.252 
In one NIT case, the judge noted that malware itself is 
computer code, which “ultimately consists of flipped bits on 
magnetic storage.”253 The judge concluded that a physical intrusion 
had occurred.254 But the judge implicitly acknowledged that the 
trespass doctrine may be a poor fit for a “computerized search” and 
bolstered his decision that the government had conducted a search 
 
 248. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 396–97 (2014)  
[A] cell phone search would typically expose to the government 
far more than the most exhaustive search of a house:  A phone not only 
contains in digital form many sensitive records previously found in the 
home; it also contains a broad array of private information never found 
in a home in any form—unless the phone is. 
 249. See United States v. Hachey, Criminal No. 16-0128, 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 34192, at *20 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 2017) (determining that the government’s 
hack back constituted a physical trespass but also noting that some may question 
that determination).  
 250. See Aucoin, supra note 130, at 1449–50 (discussing the government’s use 
of NIT technology as it pertains to the Fourth Amendment). 
 251. See, e.g., United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 574 (3d Cir. 
2010) (determining that the government’s use of NIT did not constitute search). 
But see Hachey, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34192, at *20 (determining that the use of 
NIT software was a physical intrusion). 
 252. See Hachey, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34192, at *18 (holding that “computer 
code . . . did indeed physically occupy Defendant’s computer in his home”). 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id.  
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by discussing non-trespass Supreme Court cases “where high-tech 
methods were at issue.”255 
Unlike NIT cases, when the government sinkholes a botnet it 
does not implant devices with malware.256 Rather, it takes over the 
botnet’s already existing malware, which is distributed throughout 
devices all over the world. Does the government physically intrude 
by taking over an already implanted physical object? 
It is difficult to analogize this conduct to traditional, physical 
world applications of the trespass doctrine. In Jones, the 
government performed a trespassory search by planting a tracking 
device on the defendant’s car.257 In Knotts and Karo, however, 
there was no trespass because the tracking devices had already 
been implanted in the cans at the time that they came into the 
defendants’ possession.258 The government’s takeover of malware 
does not fit neatly into either of these fact patterns. Unlike Jones, 
when the government takes over malware, the government does 
not originate the physical intrusion, it simply changes the 
character of that physical intrusion.259 Before the sinkhole, the 
botnet reported to a hacker.260 After the sinkhole, the botnet 
reports to the government.261 
Consider the following alteration of Knotts and Karo:  The 
government has an interest in tracking person A. The government 
learns that person B, a private citizen, has planted a tracking 
device on person A’s car. Without person A’s knowledge, the 
government electronically takes control of the tracking device. Has 
the government trespassed? 
 
 255. Id. at *20. 
 256. See Zeitlin, supra note 18, at 752–56 (describing the processes involved 
in a botnet takedown). 
 257. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 408–10 (2012) (distinguishing 
Jones from Knotts and Karo). 
 258. See id. at 409 (stating that, in Karo and Knotts, “at the time the beeper 
was installed the container belonged to a third party, and it did not come into 
possession of the defendant until later.”). 
 259. See Zeitlin, supra note 18, at 752–56 (describing the processes involved 
in a botnet takedown). 
 260. See id. at 748 (explaining that botnets receive commands from 
botmasters). 
 261. See id. at 751–52 (discussing how “[s]inkholing temporarily prevents the 
botmaster from controlling infected computers” and gives the government control 
instead). 
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Answering this question in the negative is, quite simply, bad 
for business. Taken to its logical conclusion, such a finding could 
be extended to determine that no trespass has occurred if the 
government surreptitiously took over a smart speaker, such as an 
Alexa-enabled Echo device, in a private home. 
One out of every five Americans has a smart speaker in their 
home.262 Although these speakers are not always recording, they 
are always listening.263 Even though they are not supposed to 
record until they hear a wake-up word, “contractors hired by device 
makers to review recordings for quality reasons report hearing 
clips that were most likely captured unintentionally, including 
drug deals and sex.”264 If there is no trespass in such a situation, 
the case would be analyzed under Katz, and therefore subjected to 
the unwieldy third-party doctrine.265 After Carpenter, it is likely 
that the Court would determine that the application of the 
third-party doctrine in that case is a bridge too far.266 But it seems 
risky to wait to find out. 
VI. Rule 41 
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals’ privacy by 
requiring the government to obtain a warrant from a neutral and 
detached magistrate before it can perform a search.267 Under Rule 
 
 262. See Kashmir Hill, Activate This “Bracelet of Silence,” and Alexa Can’t 
Eavesdrop, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/14/technology/alexa-jamming-bracelet-
privacy-armor.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2020) (explaining how ubiquitous smart 
speakers are) [perma.cc/8RXJ-G88Z]. 
 263. See id. (“By design, smart speakers have microphones that are always 
on, listening for so-called wake words like ‘Alexa,’ ‘Hey, Siri,’ or ‘O.K., Google.’ 
Only after hearing that cue are they supposed to start recording.”). 
 264. Id. 
 265. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406–07, 409 (2012) (explaining 
that the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy test has been added to . . . the 
common-law trespassory test”). 
 266. But cf. United States v. Hood, 920 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 2019) (suggesting 
that Carpenter’s impact on the third-party doctrine is limited to instances where 
only a small proportion of society would escape the electronic surveillance in 
question). 
 267. See Lo-Ji Sales v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326 (1979) (“We have 
repeatedly said that a warrant authorized by a neutral and detached judicial 
officer is ‘a more reliable safeguard against improper searches than the hurried 
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41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a magistrate judge 
or district court judge can issue a warrant to search property only 
within her district.268 The Rule enumerates a couple of 
exceptions,269 but, before 2016, none of those exceptions “addressed 
the special circumstances that arise when officers execute search 
warrants, via remote access, over modern communications such as 
the internet.”270 
Thus, before 2016, treating the government’s retrieval of IP 
addresses from infected computers as a search would have created 
the proverbial chicken and the egg dilemma:  Law enforcement 
needed to know the locations of the infected computers in order to 
get a warrant to perform the search, but the identity of infected 
computers was unavailable to law enforcement until after the 
search had already been performed.271 Adding to law enforcement’s 
dilemma, botnets are often sprawled on devices throughout the 
country.272 
Theoretically, the government could have requested a search 
warrant in every district in the United States.273 But, in addition 
 
judgment of a law enforcement officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise 
of ferreting out crime.’”). 
 268. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(1) (“[A] magistrate judge with authority in the 
district—or if none is reasonably available, a judge of a state court of record in 
the district—has authority to issue a warrant to search for and seize a person or 
property located within the district.”). 
 269. See Meyer, supra note 47, at 626–27 (“A magistrate can also issue a 
warrant for property outside her district, but only in exceptional circumstances. 
Until recently, those circumstances were: property currently within the district 
that might move outside the district, terrorism investigations, tracking device 
installation within the district, and crimes committed on certain federal 
property.”). 
 270. Letter from Mythili Raman, Acting Ass’t Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
to the Hon. Reena Raggi, Chair, Advisory Comm. on the Crim. Rules, supra note 
31. 
 271. Cf. Meyer, supra note 47, at 621 (describing particularity issues 
associated with warrants to search unknown devices and noting that there is “a 
seeming chicken-and-egg problem: how can investigators describe, with 
particularity, the very electronic device that they are attempting to discover”). 
 272. See Letter from Mythili Raman, Acting Ass’t Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to the Hon. Reena Raggi, Chair, Advisory Comm. on the Crim. Rules, 
supra note 31 (“[A] large botnet investigation is likely to require action in all 94 
districts, but coordinating 94 simultaneous warrants in the 94 districts would be 
impossible as a practical matter.”). 
 273. Id.  
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to being cumbersome for law enforcement,274 that solution is 
fraught with legal peril. There are ninety-four districts in the 
United States.275 Even if all ninety-four magistrates were served 
with nearly identical warrants, it is quite possible that there would 
not be a consensus among them.276 In the physical world, allowing 
each magistrate judge to make her own determination as to 
whether to sign a warrant is a good thing.277 However, because of 
the nature of botnet takedowns, allowing for individualized 
discretion poses a problem. If ninety-three out of ninety-four 
magistrates signed off on the search but one magistrate did not, 
the government could not perform the search because there is no 
way to make sure that the sinkhole does not retrieve information 
from the hold-out magistrate’s district.278 
To address these limitations, the Department of Justice 
campaigned for an amendment to Rule 41 that would allow 
magistrate judges to grant extra-district warrants in cases 
involving botnets and other cybercrimes.279 The amendment was 
passed in December 2016 and it provides the following: 
[A] magistrate judge with authority in any district where 
 
 274. See id. (“At a minimum, requiring so many magistrate judges to review 
virtually identical probable cause affidavits wastes judicial and investigative 
resources and creates delays that may have adverse consequences for the 
investigation.”). 
 275. See Court Role and Structure, About Federal Courts, U.S. COURTS, 
https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-role-and-structure (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2020) (“In the federal court system’s present form, 94 district 
level trial courts and 13 courts of appeals sit below the Supreme Court.”) 
[perma.cc/8DLR-E3NB]. 
 276. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984) (“Reasonable 
minds frequently may differ on the question whether a particular affidavit 
establishes probable cause, and we have thus concluded that the preference for 
warrants is most appropriately effectuated by according ‘great deference’ to a 
magistrate’s determination.”). 
 277. See id. (noting that it is appropriate to give deference to magistrate’s 
determinations). 
 278. See Rauschecker, supra note 159, at 1100 (explaining that, because law 
enforcement does not know where the infected devices are, it cannot ensure that 
it will only search computers in certain locations). 
 279. See Memorandum from Jeffrey S. Sutton, Comm. on Rules of Prac. & 
Proc, Jud. Conf. of the United States to Scott S. Harris, Clerk of the Supreme 
Court of the United States, Summary of Proposed Amendments to the Federal 
Rules (Oct. 9, 2015) (on file with the author) (discussing the proposed 
amendments). 
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activities related to a crime may have occurred has authority to 
issue a warrant to use remote access to search electronic storage 
media and to seize or copy electronically stored information 
located within or outside that district if . . . in an investigation 
of a violation of [the CFAA], the media are protected computers 
that have been damaged without authorization and are located 
in five or more districts.280 
Many opponents of Rule 41(b)(6)(B) are particularly enraged 
by the notion that it allows the government to invade the privacy 
of innocent individuals, who themselves are victims of a botnet.281 
Although this argument is perhaps effective on a visceral level, it 
has no legal ground to stand on. Under the Fourth Amendment, 
the government is allowed to search an innocent person’s property 
for evidence of a crime.282 
A more legitimate concern is how the amendment came to 
fruition. Instead of going through Congress, the Department of 
Justice pushed the Rule through the Supreme Court by way of the 
Advisory Committee.283 Under the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, the 
Supreme Court has the authority to make procedural changes to 
the federal rules, as long as the changes do not “abridge, enlarge, 
or modify any substantive right.”284 Substantive amendments, on 
the other hand, must be initiated by Congress.285 
Opponents of the Rule 41 amendment urge that Congress 
should have “initiated, debated, and enacted” the amendment 
because it is “drastic expansion of government authority.”286 
Proponents of the change insist that the Rule is simply a “venue” 
provision.287 
 
 280. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6)(B). 
 281. See Rauschecker, supra note 159, at 1096 (“[V]ictims of malware could 
find themselves doubly infiltrated: their computers infected with malware and 
used to contribute to a botnet, and then government agents given free rein to 
remotely access their computers as part of the investigation.”). 
 282. See id. (admitting that the government is allowed to search innocent 
parties’ property for evidence of a crime). 
 283. See Mordock, supra note 26 (noting that the Justice Department “pushed 
[this amendment] through the rules committee”). 
 284. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2018). 
 285. See Rauschecker, supra note 159, at 1087 (noting that only Congress has 
the authority to make substantive changes to the Federal Rules). 
 286. Id.  
 287. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b) advisory committee’s minutes, at 3, 5 (Mar. 
16–17, 2015) (presenting the notes from a discussion about the amendment in 
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In addition to the substantive versus procedural debate, some 
opponents of the Rule argue that Congress would likely have 
produced a “nuanced, detailed set of rules.”288 At the heart of this 
contention is the fear that the amendment, as written, is overbroad 
and that the government will take advantage of this breadth to 
collect data from victims’ computers that is not necessary for the 
takedown efforts.289 
The Kelihos takedown, described above, assuaged some of 
these fears.290 That takedown was the government’s first use of the 
new Rule 41 in the context of botnet takedowns.291 Opponents of 
the Amendment were relieved that the government’s takedown 
method in that case was quite similar to pre-Rule 41 peer-to-peer 
takedown methods.292 But reliance on executive self-restraint is 
dangerous.293 
This Note does not endeavor to address the debate as to 
whether the 2016 amendments to Rule 41 were an appropriate 
exercise of power under the Rules Enabling Act. This Note does, 
however, advocate that the Rule is vague and vulnerable to 
potential abuse. But, in the author’s view, codifying a more 
detailed set of rules is not the best way to ameliorate these 
concerns. Botnets, and the methods used to combat them, are 
 
which proponents of the amendment assert that the change is merely procedural); 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b) advisory committee’s note to 2016 amendment (insisting 
that the change is “not substantive” because it simply “identifies the courts that 
may consider the application for a warrant, not the constitutional requirements 
for the issuance of a warrant, which must still be met”). 
 288. Mordock, supra note 26. 
 289. See Sternstein, supra note 110 (discussing the concerns surrounding the 
Rule 41 amendment). 
 290. See id. (stating that critics were relieved to see that the government had 
not exploited the Rule 41 amendments); Sara Sun Beale & Peter Berris, Hacking 
the Internet of Things, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 161, 188 (2018) (“Some critics of 
the Rule 41 amendments were impressed that the government had been 
protective of individual privacy:  It collected only the victims’ IP addresses and 
‘non-content’ routing and signaling information so Internet Service Providers 
could notify the victims.”). 
 291. See Beale, supra note 290, at 188 (discussing the Kelihos takedown). 
 292. See id. (noting that the Kelihos takedown was similar to previous 
takedowns). 
 293. See Aucoin, supra note 130, at 1463 (“Executive restraint, while a good 
thing, is not enough on its own.”). 
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evolving constantly.294 Thus, a more dynamic approach is 
appropriate. 
A. Constitutional Uncertainty 
Right now, the fate of botnet victims’ privacy rights is at the 
mercy of “ongoing case law development.”295 But waiting for 
caselaw to address constitutional concerns regarding Rule 
41(b)(6)(B) is dangerous for two reasons. First, because of the 
breadth of botnet takedowns and the “sheer amount of data” 
contained in smart devices, one overly invasive search could result 
in the exposure of a massive amount of private information.296 
Second, courts are unlikely to scrutinize the constitutionality 
of warrants obtained under Rule 41(b)(6)(B). The owners of 
infected devices will not be prosecuted with evidence procured from 
their computers, so the constitutionality of warrants obtained 
under Rule 41(b)(6)(B) will not be challenged under motions to 
suppress. Thus, a judge would only consider whether a warrant 
granted under Rule 41(b)(6)(B) violated a botnet victim’s Fourth 
Amendment rights if that victim filed a civil suit. 
A civil suit is particularly unlikely because it is quite possible 
that a victim whose computer has been subjected to a hack back 
will never even know it.297 The Rules require the government to 
make “reasonable efforts” to notify victims,298 but it is unclear what 
“reasonable efforts” entail.299 
 
 294. See supra Section II (briefly explaining botnets).  
 295. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b) advisory committee’s note to 2016 amendment. 
 296. See Gershowitz, supra note 121, at 590 (“[B]ecause of the sheer amount 
of data held on cell phones and the clear overbreadth, particularity, and good faith 
exception problems present in post-Riley search warrants, addressing the 
execution of the warrant ex post is extremely problematic.”); see also Rauschecker, 
supra note 159, at 1091 (“The Rule 41 changes would enable the government to 
obtain a single warrant that would permit it to access and search the thousands 
or millions of computers involved in a botnet.”). 
 297. See Rauschecker, supra note 159, at 1098 (discussing the likelihood that 
owners of hacked computers will never receive notice of the hack and noting that 
“owners of searched computers who do not get notice of a search may never find 
out that the search has occurred and will therefore never be able to contest the 
search warrant”). 
 298. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(1)(C). 
 299. See Rauschecker, supra note 159, at 1098–99 (“It is unclear . . . what 
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The Department of Justice has suggested that it may ask ISPs 
to tell victims that their IP addresses have been recorded by the 
government.300 When the government employs a takedown method 
that requires action on the part of the owner of the device, the 
government has independent incentive, outside of compliance with 
Rule 41, to provide such notice. However, the Rule gives the 
government freedom to remotely remove or manipulate the 
malware.301 Under those circumstances, some have suggested that 
it is naïve to imagine that every victim will actually be notified.302 
B. The Almighty Magistrate 
When the government asks a magistrate judge to sign off on a 
warrant under Rule 41(b)(6)(B), it puts an incredible amount of 
power in her hands.303 Because of the sheer breadth of the search 
and the sensitivity of the information that could potentially be 
obtained, one misstep could be devastating.304 Furthermore, 
because botnet victims are unlikely to bring suit, it is likely that 
missteps will go uncorrected.305 
 
notice attempts would constitute a reasonable effort.”). 
 300. See Letter from Peter J. Kadzik, Ass’t Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Just., to 
Ron Wyden, Senator, U.S. Senate (Nov. 18, 2016), 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3225184/DOJ-Rule-41-Response.pdf 
(discussing how the government will attempt to notify a botnet victim that her 
device has been searched) [perma.cc/9D87-ZFUS]. 
 301. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6). 
 302. See Rauschecker, supra note 159, at 1098 (“It is unrealistic . . . to expect 
every computer owner of an affected botnet to be notified of a government 
search.”). 
 303. See Sternstein, supra note 110 (noting that the Rule 41 Amendment 
“empower[s] judges to grant a single warrant for searching or seizing information 
on any number of devices, regardless of location”).  
 304. See Gershowitz, supra note 121, at 590 (“[B]ecause of the sheer amount 
of data held on cell phones and the clear overbreadth, particularity, and good faith 
exception problems present in post-Riley search warrants, addressing the 
execution of the warrant ex post is extremely problematic.”); see also Rauschecker, 
supra note 159, at 1091 (“The Rule 41 changes would enable the government to 
obtain a single warrant that would permit it to access and search the thousands 
or millions of computers involved in a botnet.”). 
 305. See Rauschecker, supra note 159, at 1099 (explaining that many victims 
will be unaware of the search so courts will rarely review the warrant’s 
legitimacy).  
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Thus, it is particularly important that the magistrate judge 
granting the warrant makes the proper decision in the first 
place.306 This is no simple task:  Botnets are technologically 
complex and ever evolving.307 To satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s 
“reasonableness” requirement, takedown methods should be as 
unintrusive as possible, while still being effective.308 But if 
magistrates do not understand the technology, they cannot 
evaluate whether the government’s request is reasonable.309 To 
resolve this problem, magistrate judges should be required to 
attend Continuing Judicial Education programs focused on botnet 
technology and takedown methods.310 Such programs would 
provide magistrates with the technological framework required to 
understand the government’s Rule 41 takedown requests and 
determine if those requests are reasonable.311 
VII. Conclusion 
Rule 41 is indeed potentially dangerous. But the alternatives 
to that Rule are no better. Botnets are destructive and cannot be 
allowed to run amuck. The government’s efforts to combat botnets 
are not only beneficial, but crucial, to private citizens.312 Rule 41 
allows the government to undertake those efforts within the 
 
 306. See Paul Ohm, Massive Hard Drives, General Warrants, and the Power 
of Magistrate Judges, 97 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 10–12 (2011) (discussing the 
potential ramifications of an ill-advised digital search).  
 307. See Aucoin, supra note 130, at 1462 (explaining the complexities of the 
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 308. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their 
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 309. See Aucoin, supra note 130, at 1462 (“If judges do not understand the 
technology then they cannot understand the government action that they 
authorize.”). 
 310. See id. at 1462–63 (recommending mandatory Continuing Judicial 
Education in order to “ensur[e] competency in government hacking and 
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confines of the Fourth Amendment.313 If Rule 41 did not allow the 
government to apply for warrants in order to perform takedowns, 
quite frankly, the government would perform those takedowns 
anyway.314 And the result would lead to the perversion of the 
Fourth Amendment’s mandates.315 
This Note demonstrates that potential for perversion by 
tracing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as it pertains to 
technology. Many federal courts have recently invoked that 
jurisprudence to reach the conclusion that the government’s 
retrieval of an IP address is not a search.316 Most courts have 
reached this conclusion by applying the third-party doctrine, 
holding that an individual has no legitimate privacy interest in her 
IP address.317 In this digital era, that understanding of the 
third-party doctrine is dangerous. Carpenter invites courts to walk 
back a bit on the third-party doctrine, before it becomes a black 
hole that swallows privacy rights.318 Courts should accept that 
invitation. 
Having established that the government’s collection of IP 
addresses is indeed a search, this Note does not seek to eliminate 
the government’s opportunity to perform that search. In fact, the 
collection of IP addresses from infected computers is one of the 
least intrusive steps the government can take in order to 
effectively combat botnets. That method ensures that the victim 
 
 313. See supra Section VI. Rule 41 (explaining how the amendment to Rule 41 
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 318.  See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018) (holding 
that cell site location information is not covered by the third-party doctrine). 
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will receive notice of the search and minimizes the government’s 
need to muck around on her computer.319 
Instead, the government should be able to collect IP addresses 
if it has a valid warrant. Thus, in the age of botnets, the 
amendment to Rule 41 is essential to ensure the proper balance of 
national safety and individual privacy. This Note concedes that the 
wording of the Rule is broad but argues that specific, detailed 
mandates are not a realistic solution because technology is rapidly 
advancing. In the context of botnet takedowns, it is dangerous and 
unrealistic to await caselaw that would reign in potential 
government oversteps. 
Continuing Judicial Education for magistrates is the best way 
to ensure that the government does not exploit its Rule 41 
powers.320 There should be mandatory programs that provide 
magistrates with sufficient knowledge to understand the 
technology behind botnets and botnet takedowns. Armed with that 
basis of knowledge, magistrates can do their job:  Provide a barrier 
between individual privacy and potentially overzealous policing. 
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